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ABSTRACT 
A thorough understanding of Irregular Warfare (IW) and the principles of 
organizational theory and design will enable the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
organize efficiently and effectively for operations within the Irregular Warfare 
Environment, while maintaining its conventional capabilities. We develop our argument 
for this thesis in several stages.  First, we define irregular warfare and differentiate it 
from conventional warfare through the development of our critical success factors.  We 
introduce organizational theory and design in order to incorporate the critical success 
factors.  We conclude that the DoD should reorganize certain elements of the U.S. 
Special Operations Command by incorporating existing capabilities, focusing on 
conducting operations within the Irregular Warfare Environment, and implementing our 
critical success factors.   
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Conflicts within the Irregular Warfare (IW) environment require a population-
centric, holistic, long-term, and nonconventional, approach.  The misunderstanding of IW 
and the improper organizational structure within the DoD has hindered its ability to 
succeed within IW environments.  The DoD is using organizations designed to defeat 
conventional threats instead of organizations selected, trained and equipped to succeed in 
Irregular Warfare.  This concept is reinforced in Joint Publication 3–0: “(Irregular) 
warfare that has the population as its “focus of operations” requires a different mindset 
and different capabilities [emphasis added] than warfare that focuses on defeating an 
adversary militarily.” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, pp. I–6)   
This thesis states that a thorough understanding of IW and the principles of 
organizational theory and design enables the DoD to organize efficiently and effectively 
for operations within the Irregular Warfare Environment (IWE), while maintaining its 
conventional capabilities. We develop our argument for this thesis in several stages.  
First, we define Irregular Warfare and differentiate it from conventional warfare through 
the development of our critical success factors.  We introduce organizational theory and 
design in order to incorporate the success factors.  Next, we analyze options for future 
change and finish by providing recommendations for implementation.   
A widespread misunderstanding of Irregular Warfare has led to a desire to elevate 
IW to becoming “as strategically important as traditional warfare.” (United States 
Department of Defense, 2008)  This elevation of IW has challenged all of DoD to adapt 
to this important lesson learned at the expense of maintaining our balance of capabilities.  
By understanding the differences between Irregular and Traditional Warfare, and the key 
factors that enable success in both, it becomes obvious that an organization suited for one 
is sub-optimal when operating in the other.  To better prepare the DoD to meet future 
challenges in both environments, the DoD should establish a separate organization, 
incorporating existing capabilities, focused on conducting operations within the IWE, and 
implementing our critical success factors.   
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Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and 
nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. 
IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the 
full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an 
adversary’s power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted 
struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners. 
–Joint Publication 3–0 (Joint Operations) 
A. BACKGROUND 
A new administration in Washington, D.C., a nation weary of eight-plus years of 
fighting, almost 5,000 deaths, over 30,000 casualties (Fischer, 2009, p. 1) and huge 
defense spending in the middle of an economic slowdown, all lead us to agree with 
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, who believes that the next conflict will not be 
another Afghanistan or Iraq.  More appropriately, he believes future success for the 
military comes “primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their 
security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly 
and controversial direct military intervention” (Gates, 2009). 
Before shifting our focus, this thesis began as a search for a “better” and more 
efficient way in which General Purpose Forces (GPF) and Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) could interact and integrate on the battlefield, given the complexities involved in 
combat, as experienced through both operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  
The research team, which consists of two Special Forces Officers and an Armor Officer, 
brought a wealth of recent combat experience from both theaters that drove our research 
and debate.   
It became evident that, while SOF–GPF integration is an important topic for 
research, the paramount issue to overcome when dealing with the population-centric 
focus of the current and, arguably, the future threat to our Nation is that of utilizing our 
forces in the most effective manner.  In other words, it is imperative to identify the 
elements within the Department of Defense (DoD) that maintain the comparative 
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advantage1 to succeed in the current and future situations we face.  We take it as given 
that the United States Military GPF are second to none on the conventional battlefield.  
Their organization, training, equipment, and culture ensure they maintain the capability to 
deploy, fight, and defeat any conventional opposition.    
Our nation has expended precious time and effort debating how best to prepare 
for our future threats by focusing too much on our current problems. The belief that 
traditional or conventional warfare has evolved and even possibly been replaced by other 
forms of warfare such as “Hybrid,” “Fourth Generation” “Unconventional” or 
“Irregular,” continues to be debated at the executive level (United States Army, 2009, 
August).  In line with this, many agree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 
comment about a perceived “requirement for all services to be SOF-like” in order to best 
prepare for what they see as a new form of warfare, either at the expense of, or in 
addition to, our current conventional capabilities and dominance (BG Sacolick, 2009, 
April).  Indications from within the DoD are that this “SOF-like” transition stems from a 
false linking of irregular threats with Irregular Warfare (United States Army, 2009, 
August).  There are also those who are adamant in their belief that warfare has not 
changed much over the course of human civilization and, more importantly, that IW does 
not represent some new evolution to the way in which wars are fought (United States 
Army, 2009, August).  An April 2009 Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) White Paper 
summarized this argument by saying,  
The Army does not view [Irregular Warfare] as a distinct, unique category 
of conflict: warfare is warfare. The same capabilities developed for 
regular, symmetric adversaries can and must be adapted for use against 
unregulated ‘irregular enemies.’ (United States Department of the Army, 
2009, p. 6) 
 
 
                                                 
1 In reference to DoD, we use this term to explain the ability of a given unit or organization to conduct 
a certain type of operation, or to conduct operations within a certain environment, with a higher degree of 
efficiency and effectiveness than another unit or organization. 
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In a recent Military Strategy article, Michael C. Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon 
argue against the shift of focus from traditional to irregular warfare for the DoD as a 
whole.  They identify the need for separate organizations that are equally good at 
performing missions within their respective environments.  A synopsis of this argument 
is included below:  
Paradoxically, no matter what it emphasizes, the military threats the 
United States is or will be most capable of defeating are the ones it is least 
likely to face, since potential adversaries will be deterred and seek other 
ways of confrontation.  However, with some smart and careful 
investments, including the recognition that not all parts of the military 
have to be optimized for the same task, the United States military can both 
lock in its conventional dominance and continue to improve its ability to 
succeed in the irregular wars most likely to dominate the landscape in the 
short to medium term. (Horowitz & Shalmon, 2009, p. 302) 
We believe that changing our current conventional military forces, and making 
them as proficient in the IW environment (IWE) as in the traditional environment, is a 
flawed approach.  This will lead to the loss of conventional capabilities, creating an 
environment in which the favored enemy strategy will be whatever we are least prepared 
for.  
Conversely, maintaining our conventional prowess, while balancing it with a 
strong indirect capability, leaves our adversaries with fewer options.  This indirect 
capability exists, but needs to be bolstered and enhanced in order to balance the force.  
Within the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) exists forces that 
are specially selected, trained, organized, and equipped to thrive in the IW environment.  
By adjusting the management and utilization of these forces, the nation can achieve 
dominance within the IW environment that is on par with the dominance it holds in 
conventional warfare.  While making GPF more adaptable and able to conduct IW-type 
missions during major operations is prudent, refocusing them away from their core tasks 




Given this background, the DoD should update its approach to IW by 
reorganizing the forces best suited to operate in that environment, and refocus on long-
term, relationship-based partnerships to help our allies identify and combat problems 
without large-scale U.S. troop involvement.  As U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
observed during his address to the October 2007 meeting of the Association of the United 
States Army, “The most important component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we 
do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern 
their own countries” (Bluesteen, 2009).  This is consistent with the proposal submitted by 
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that deploying forces 
should return to the same areas, “to build and sustain stronger relationships with local 
leaders” (McMichael, 2009, May, p. 8), and with the guidance for the 2009 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR), that is looking at potential conventional threats of North Korea 
and China (Castelli, 2009). 
B. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
Since the beginning of the “War on Terror” in 2001, the DoD has been unable to 
maintain the advantage over our adversaries to the degree necessary to win.  Many 
successes have been achieved and battles won, but eight years later, the United States is 
still at war and making, as some would argue, many of the same mistakes.  Why?  Our 
group has learned through research and experience that the DoD does not understand IW 
and, therefore, cannot effectively or efficiently organize for it.   
Conflicts within the IW environment require a population-centric, holistic, long-
term, and non-conventional, approach.  As experienced in Iraq’s “Sunni Awakening,” 
these approaches can eventually be exploited, but, more often than not, it takes time, 
resources, and the needless death of numerous people, both civilian and military, before 
the knowledge to develop the proper strategy emerges.  If the U.S. government had an 
organization designed to thrive within this environment, developed using the appropriate 
organizational design elements, and able to implement the most appropriate strategy from 
the beginning (or even better, before the conflict expands beyond the host nation’s 
capability), success would be more rapidly achievable.  It would also be more effective 
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and efficient.  That is the problem as it relates to this thesis.  The misunderstanding of IW 
and the improper organizational structure within the DoD has hindered its ability to 
succeed within IW environments.  The DoD is using organizations designed to defeat 
conventional threats instead of organizations selected, trained, and equipped to succeed in 
Irregular Warfare.  This concept is reinforced in Joint Publication 3–0, “[Irregular] 
warfare that has the population as its ‘focus of operations’ requires a different mindset 
and different capabilities [emphasis added)] than warfare that focuses on defeating an 
adversary militarily” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, pp. I–6).   
C. THESIS 
A thorough understanding of IW and the principles of organizational theory and 
design will enable the DoD to organize efficiently and effectively for operations within 
the IWE, while maintaining its conventional capabilities.  
D. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the terms associated with Irregular Warfare, 
develop several critical success factors associated with IW, and to provide 
recommendations for reorganization of select DoD elements that are focused on 
conducting the unique activities within the IWE.  We will make evident the contrasts 
between Irregular and Traditional Warfare in order to illustrate the need for a separate 
organization with a separate focus. 
E. RESEARCH AND SCOPE 
The research associated with this thesis revolves around Joint Doctrine and 
organizational theory and design.  We use these to clarify what Irregular Warfare is and 
what its subordinated activities are.  Once clarified and defined, the activities are used to 
specify Irregular Warfare requirements and analyze the organizational-environment 
critical success factors necessary for their execution.  This builds on previous research 
arguing for the creation of an IW Command, and furthers it by providing factors that will 
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enable the successful employment of such a command.  To the extent possible, this thesis 
avoids using cliché, or hot-button and non-doctrinal, terms and definitions.   
The scope of this thesis is focused on the DoD and not the inter-agency (IA) 
community.  While we briefly address, and acknowledge the importance of, the inter-
agency component of operating in the Irregular Warfare environment, our 
recommendations are for the DoD specifically.  The military must define its 
organizations, missions, responsibilities, and purposes before addressing how the DoD 
participates in what must be a holistic approach to Irregular Warfare.  As Secretary of 
Defense Robert M. Gates said in an address to the Marine Corps War College, “The 
interagency needs to get better and stronger, frankly, to match our capabilities, so that our 
capabilities have the proper context in terms of the whole-government objectives” 
(Kruzel, 2009). The end state is to reorganize select elements of the Special Operations 
community under one organization focused on Irregular Warfare. 
F. CHAPTER REVIEW 
We develop our argument for this thesis in several stages.  First, we define 
Irregular Warfare and differentiate it from conventional warfare through the development 
of our critical success factors.  We introduce organizational theory and design in order to 
incorporate the success factors.  Next, we analyze options for future change and finish by 
providing recommendations for implementation. 
Chapter II establishes the doctrinal definitions of both Irregular Warfare and its 
sub-tasks.  We assert throughout this chapter that IW is an environment in which specific 
activities are conducted, synchronized with the DoD, IA and the host nation (HN), in 
order to gain or maintain legitimacy and influence over a relevant population.  As 
defined, we show that while the term “IW” is relatively new, the concepts it represents 
have existed throughout the history of armed conflict.   
In Chapter III, we explain why IW is an extremely complex, long-duration, and 
population-centric environment, which requires a different form of organization to 
operate efficiently and effectively.  We further differentiate IW from traditional warfare, 
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with the primary difference being a long-term, population and state-legitimacy focus 
versus a short-term enemy-centric focus.  These differences demonstrate that 
organizations designed to conduct attrition warfare are sub-optimal in comparison to 
those specially designed and organized specifically for IW.  This is not to say that 
General Purpose Forces (GPF) cannot operate in the IWE, rather, that these aspects may 
be organizationally limiting to fundamental changes required to operate effectively in the 
IW environment.   
We then develop seven external and ten internal critical success factors that 
organizations must incorporate when operating in the IW environment.  These 
environmental factors further highlight the differences of IW versus traditional warfare, 
and illuminate why organizations established for one type of warfare are sub-optimal in 
other environments. 
In Chapter IV, we incorporate the complexities and uniqueness of IW discussed in 
Chapter II, and the critical success factors developed in Chapter III, with the principles of 
organizational theory and design.  This evaluation of organizations using the five 
components of organizational theory and design (Structure, Environment, Work 
Processes, Human Resources, and Culture) show how incorporating each element of the 
theory with the success factors is necessary for success in the IW environment.   
In Chapter V, we evaluate the two basic options for change.  Using business 
process redesign as a model, we assess the feasibility of creating a new organization 
versus modifying an existing one.  We argue that building a new organization duplicates 
current capabilities and increases expenses without appreciable increases in efficiency or 
effectiveness.  Therefore, a new organization is not a viable option.  We then argue that 
since the DoD has sub-organizations better suited and already manned with personnel 
that are specifically selected, trained, and educated to succeed within the IW 
environment, they should be reorganized under one organization outside of USSOCOM. 
This will ensure a common purpose and mission, while preventing misuse and limiting 




will allow an IW organization to best utilize the operational-environment and 
organizational-environment factors to select, train and manage elements operating within 
the IWE.   
Finally, Chapter VI reviews pertinent information from each of the five preceding 
chapters, and concludes that the DoD should establish a separate organization, 
incorporating existing capabilities focused on conducting operations within the IWE.  We 
make five recommendations that enable the successful implementation of our research 
findings.  Lastly, we identify several future research possibilities. 
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II. COMPLEXITIES OF IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Traditional Warfare. A form of warfare between the regulated militaries 
of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an 
adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or 
seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s 
government or policies.  
–DoD Directive 3000.07 
 
What makes IW “irregular” is the focus of its operations—a relevant 
population—and its strategic purpose—to gain or maintain control or 
influence over, and the support of that relevant population through 
political, psychological, and economic methods. Warfare that has the 
population as its “focus of operations” requires a different mindset and 
different capabilities than warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary 
militarily. 
– Joint Pub 3–0 (Joint Operations) 
A. BACKGROUND 
In 1962, the DoD focused on the term “Special Warfare” as an all-encompassing 
term to operationalize the indirect approach to fighting communist expansion throughout 
the Cold War.  During this time, the Soviet Union’s strategy involved spreading 
communism by enabling resistance movements and insurgencies throughout third world 
countries; this was Unconventional Warfare.  The U.S. strategy to counter this involved 
the use of Special Warfare, which included Counterinsurgency, Unconventional Warfare, 
and Psychological activities (General Decker, 2009). 
Forty-plus years later, the U.S. is faced with similar challenges.  The Soviet 
Union has been replaced by transnational terrorist organizations and criminal networks, 
as well as a myriad of other entities, set on shifting the balance of power within their 
regions.  In order to counter these threats, the DoD has re-emphasized indirect strategies 
and coined the term “Irregular Warfare” to characterize this environment.  Although there 
is debate within the DoD and other U.S. government agencies on whether this term is 
appropriate, or even needed, the fact remains that a DoD directive places the conduct of 
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“IW” to be equally important as traditional warfare.  Since then, the use of the term “IW” 
has become en vogue to the point that it seems that anyone even remotely related to the 
Global War on Terror is “conducting IW.”  
Although the concept of IW has increased in popularity, the continued 
misunderstanding of the term has led to confusion. As evidenced by a United States 
Forces Command (USFORSCOM) sponsored IW study in 2006, the term Irregular 
Warfare is being used as a catch-all term to represent anything nontraditional:  
IW is used loosely as a synonym for unconventional warfare, asymmetric 
warfare, guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, nontraditional warfare, low 
intensity conflict, insurgency, rebellion, revolt, civil war, insurrection, 
revolutionary warfare, internal war, counter insurgency, subversive war, 
war within a population, intrastate war, internal development, internal 
security, internal defense, stability, law and order, nation building, state 
building, small war, peacemaking, peacekeeping, fourth generation 
warfare (4GW), and global war on terror. (GWOT) (United States Joint 
Forces Command, 2006, pp. II–3) 
B. WHAT IS IRREGULAR WARFARE? 
The Joint definition of Irregular Warfare is 
… a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant population(s).  Irregular warfare favors indirect 
and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of 
military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, 
influence, and will. (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, p. 282)   
As with the term, the definition itself has created skeptics who believe the 
definition should identify who conducts it, or how it is done, instead of why the nation 
engages in IW (Coons & Harned, 2009, p. 98).  Adding to the controversy, the term 
“Warfare” indicates a level of violence that is not conducive to the interagency 
community’s normal operating environment.  As Colonel Joseph Osborne, the former 
USSOCOM J10 (Irregular Warfare), states, our interagency partners “Don’t do warfare” 
(2009, p. 1).  In the end, definitions are important to facilitate a common understanding, 
but the critical concept is that at the operational and strategic levels, IW uses indirect 
methods to gain or maintain the support of the relevant population. 
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There is also a divide amongst the DoD and interagency community over whether 
IW is an environment or an operation.  According to the initial IW Joint Operating 
Concept (IW JOC) published in 2007, IW can be conducted, thus being an operation, but 
after further analysis, the United States Special Operations Command (USASOC) and 
USSOCOM believe IW is an environment in which operations are conducted.  In other 
words, it is not an operation in and of itself (United States Army John F. Kennedy Special 
Warfare Center and School, 2009).  This concept of an environment over task is 
reinforced by Joint Publication 3–0 (Joint Operations) which states, “What makes IW 
“irregular” is the focus of its operations—a relevant population—and its strategic 
purpose—to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of that relevant 
population through political, psychological, and economic methods (emphasis added)” 
(United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, pp. I–6).  The final clarification that IW is an 
environment is illustrated by comparing its counter-environment, traditional warfare.  A 
commander does not “conduct” traditional warfare, it is an environment that,  
… typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military 
operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military 
capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, and space 
physical domains and the information environment. (United States Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2008, pp. I–5) 
Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, IW refers to an environment in which 
population-centric operations are conducted in order to achieve U.S. objectives.  This 
builds on an acceptance and an understanding of the difference in the focus of the 




Figure 1.   Contrasting Conventional and Irregular Warfare (From USSOCOM; 
USMCCDC 2007, p. 8).  Originally derived from Gordon McCormick’s 
“Diamond” Model. 
The focus on the relevant population is what sets IW apart from traditional, 
“conventional” approaches to warfare.  Within the IW environment, “indirect” refers to 
approaches that: 
… focus on addressing the underlying economic, political, cultural, or 
security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population…disrupt, 
dislocate, and defeat adversaries by attacking them physically and 
psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting … 
empower, enable, support, or leverage interagency and other partners to 
attack adversaries militarily or non-militarily…take actions with or against 
third-party states or armed groups in order to influence adversaries…and 
to subvert the power and influence of adversaries over the relevant 
populations. (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 20) 
C. IW ACTIVITIES 
Since IW is an environment, there are many activities conducted within it.  
Similar to the concept that traditional warfare has operational and tactical tasks, the IW 
JOC outlines the 14 activities conducted within the IW environment (USSOCOM; 
USMCCDC, 2007, pp. 9–10):   
 Insurgency 
 Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
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 Unconventional warfare (UW) 
 Terrorism 
 Counterterrorism (CT) 
 Foreign internal defense (FID) 
 Stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction  (SSTR) 
 Strategic communications 
 Psychological operations (PSYOP) 
 Information operations (IO) 
 Civil-military operations (CMO) 
 Intelligence and counterintelligence activities 
 Transnational criminal activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms 
dealing, and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW 
 Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries  
Of these 14 activities, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 (Irregular 
Warfare) establishes five primary activities of Irregular Warfare: Foreign Internal 
Defense (FID), Counter Insurgency (COIN), Counter Terrorism (CT), Stability, Security, 
Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, and Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
(United States Department of Defense, 2008, p. 2).  The Joint definitions of each are 
below. 
 Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Participation by civilian and military 
agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another 
government or other designated organization to free and protect its society 
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 
 Counter-Insurgency (COIN): Those military, paramilitary, political, 
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to 
defeat insurgency. 
 Counter-Terrorism (CT): Operations that include the offensive measures 
taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism.  
 Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR): An 
overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and 
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 
instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure 
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environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency 
infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. 
 Unconventional Warfare (UW): Activities conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a 
government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area (United States 
Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2009). 
The first four of these activities (FID, COIN, CT, and SSTR) are ways that the 
U.S. can enable a HN to counter an existing or potential threat of insurgency.  These 
activities seek to maintain a low U.S. troop signature, which protects or enhances the 
legitimacy of the HN.  UW is the only activity that does not seek to protect or enhance 
the legitimacy of the existing government within the HN.  It is conducted in order to 
“coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power” (United States Army 
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2009).  Within the IW 
environment, FID, COIN, CT and SSTR are used to counter an adversarial actor 
conducting an Unconventional Warfare campaign against another nation (Maxwell, 2009, 
April).   
In line with The Art of War by Sun Tzu, you must “know your enemy” in order to 
defeat him; therefore, in order to efficiently plan for and conduct the core tasks that are 
associated with IW, one must understand both the enemy and what he is trying to do.  
Understanding how to conduct the hardest IW task—UW—greatly enhances one’s ability 
to achieve success conducting any other IW task.  This concept was reinforced when 
(former) Director of Central Intelligence and now Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 
speaking at the 1992 dedication of the OSS Memorial, said, “It has long been an article of 
faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide operations, that if you can do the UW 
missions, you can do all others” (Quoted in Maxwell, 1995, p. 122).  
D. SUMMARY 
As a term, IW is new, but the concepts it represents have endured throughout the 
history of armed conflict.  This chapter establishes the doctrinal definitions of both IW 
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and its sub-tasks.  We assert throughout this chapter that IW is an environment in which 
specific activities are conducted, synchronized with the DoD, IA and the HN, in order to 
gain or maintain legitimacy and influence over a relevant population.  Of these activities, 
FID, COIN, CT, SSTR, and UW are the primary focus.  The first four of these activities 
are done out of a strategic necessity and provide assistance and support to willing partner-
nations.  As a strategic option, UW provides support to resistance movements or 
insurgencies in support of U.S. objectives.   
This doctrinal understanding allows us to proceed into the operational-
environment and organizational critical success factors that must be addressed in order to 
operate within the IW environment. 
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III. CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Pure military skill is not enough.  A full spectrum of military, para-
military, and civil action must be blended to produce success.  The enemy 
uses economic and political warfare, propaganda and naked military 
aggression in an endless combination to oppose a free choice of 
government, and suppress the rights of the individual by terror, by 
subversion and by force of arms.  To win in this struggle, our officers and 
men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil 
actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of this mission. 
– President John F. Kennedy 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Developing and implementing successful strategies to address threats in the IWE 
require a better understanding of the situation as a whole.  Acknowledging that IW differs 
from conventional warfare, experts such as David Galula, David Kilcullen, and Gordon 
McCormick, as well as other key authors and public officials, have all publicized that a 
different approach is required to succeed.   
In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare, David Galula details four laws of 
successful COIN warfare that must be understood and implemented (1964, pp. 52–55).  
These laws are: 
 Support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for 
the insurgent 
 Support is gained through an active minority 
 Support from the population is conditional 
 Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.  
In his most recent book, The Accidental Guerilla, David Kilcullen reinforces 
these laws through his discussion of the current GWOT.  Building upon Galula’s lessons, 
Kilcullen states that, “this will be a protracted conflict” in which we will “need to use 
military force extremely sparingly.”  He argues further that, “nonmilitary means need to 
receive greater emphasis,” and that, “we need to emphasize the primacy of virtue, moral 
authority, and credibility” (2009, pp. 284–286). 
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Analyzing the works of numerous counterinsurgency theorists during his time 
with the RAND Corporation and as the head of the Defense Analysis Department of the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Professor Gordon McCormick developed a model to 
illustrate how to apply these different approaches in IW.  Specifically, part of his 
“Diamond” model emphasizes the importance of securing the population first, in order 
overcome the state’s initial information disadvantage (i.e., who and where are the 
insurgents) before the insurgents are able to overcome their initial force disadvantage 
(McCormick, Horton, & Harrison, 2007, pp. 327–328). 
In keeping with these recognized experts, USSOCOM recently released its 
version of the laws and characteristic discussed above.  According to USSOCOM, 
activities conducted within the IW environment are, more often than not, indirect, 
enduring, persistent, proactive, and population centric.  Additionally, they must respect 
legitimate sovereignty and be linked to an over-arching U.S. strategy (Osborne, 2009).  
The IW JOC incorporates these same concepts in its description of the 
operational-environment of IW.  It states IW environments can exist within friendly, 
hostile or non-belligerent states.  It describes the key elements of IW as taking an indirect 
approach, on a global scale that is focused on the will of the people and unified action.  
IW requires a persistent presence, based on interpersonal relationships, fusing operations 
and intelligence, expanding the role of the GPF, and developing alternative command and 
control systems (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 2).   
Taken together, joined with the extensive writings and commentary on the current 
Iraq and Afghanistan wars and combined with our personal experiences, we have 
developed seven operational-environmental and 10 organizational-environmental factors 
that are critical to success in IW.  These critical success factors are summarized in Table 






Account for U.S. and Host Nation Political 
Situation Focus on Enhancing HN Legitimacy 
Foster a Home Grown Solution Develop Regional Focuses 
Develop a Population-Centric Approach Reinforce Relationship Building 
Region Requires Long-term Commitment Maintain a Long-term Focus 
Increase Capacity of Host Nation Security 
Forces Influence through Multiple Methods 
Increase Capacity of Host Nation Essential 
Services Operate With and Through HN Forces 
Do not rely Solely on Military Force for 
Success Enhance Small Unit Operations 
 Decentralize Decision Making 
 Foster Innovation and Creativity 
 Focus Rewards System on Long term Effects 
Table 1.   Irregular Warfare Critical Success Factors 
In general, these factors provide insight on what the operational-environment 
looks like within IW and what an organization operating within IW must be capable of in 
order to be successful 
B. IW OPERATIONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The operational-environment is defined as, “A composite of the conditions, 
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the 
decisions of the commander” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, p. 398).  The 
success factors presented below illustrate the differences in those conditions, 
circumstances, and influences affecting a commander’s decision making in the IW 
environment.  Organizations operating in the IW environment must understand and 
integrate these factors into their operations in order to be successful. 
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1. Account for U.S. and Host Nation Political Situation 
The decision to deploy forces, or allow another nation’s military forces into a host 
nation,2 requires a level of political and public acceptance in both nations.  For example, 
it is hard to believe that the United States would enter into another protracted and large-
scale nation-building attempt after the recent issues of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
By understanding the local and foreign political situations, one can better choose 
the appropriate strategy that is acceptable to all parties and will result in the most support 
both at home and abroad.  For example, the persistent support provided to the Philippines 
as part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) is purposely designed to 
incorporate a small footprint and limited U.S. intervention due to the domestic pressures 
on the Philippine government.  Referencing the complex environment within the 
Philippines, COL David Maxwell, said that it would “undermine Philippine military and 
government legitimacy if U.S. forces conducted direct or unilateral combat operations 
(Maxwell, 2008). 
The political sensitivities associated with maintaining the will of the American 
people is essential when waging traditional warfare.  However, no consideration is given 
to the political sensitivities of the enemy’s population.  Conversely, within IW both the 
political sensitivities of the U.S. and host nation populations must be taken into account.  
That is, support must be gained and maintained both at home and abroad in order to 
succeed. 
2. Foster a Homegrown Solution 
With an appreciation for the political situations at home and within the host 
nation, IW activities must seek to empower the host nation and local population to create 
their own solution and allow them to have true ownership of it.  As long as the IW 
activities focus on long-term engagement through indirect approaches that build capacity 
for military and civil services, these homegrown solutions are more likely to last.  On the 
                                                 
2 The use of the term “host nation” typically refers to the legitimate government in power.  However, 
throughout this thesis, we will use this term to refer to whatever indigenous organization that the U.S. is 
sponsoring, either the resistance movement or insurgency as in UW or the legitimate government as in 
COIN, FID, SSTR, and CT. 
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other hand, if the solutions and implementations appear to be merely exported, or worse, 
imposed from the United States without consideration of the local population, they are 
doomed to failure.  
This understanding will allow forces to properly develop and support (or 
undermine if conducting UW operations) the sociological, political, and governing 
structures to enable the host nation to succeed.  Conversely, disregarding the accepted 
social, political and governing methods within IW is self-defeating as it will be viewed as 
being imposed by the U.S.  One example of this is the natural inclination of foreign 
governments to provide aid directly to the people of another country without 
incorporating the local governance systems.  While this aid and support may be well 
intentioned and provided in the name of the host nation’s government, it rarely is seen as 
such by the local population.  In Afghanistan, coalition and Non-governmental 
Organization (NGO) actors provided support thinking it would increase support for the 
Afghan government, but the tribal leaders were forced to pledge allegiance to the Taliban 
who, while being oppressive, provided “the order and predictability it crave[d] in the 
deeply threatening, uncertain environments of insurgency” (Kilcullen, 2009, pp. 68–69).  
While acknowledging the need for external military forces to help provide 
security, the IW JOC recommends against the widespread use of direct military action 
within the IW environment because of the damage done to the legitimacy and credibility 
of the host nation government (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 18).  The home-grown 
solution thus follows T. E. Lawrence’s concept of, “Better the Arabs do it tolerably than 
you do it perfectly.  It is their war and you are to help them, not win it for them” 
(Lawrence, 1917).  Once external forces understand this concept and learn to step back 
from full control, they realize that, “Local initiatives afford less control but carry greater 
likelihood of success” (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 16).  In the end, this locally refined approach 
allows our partners to send a powerful message to their own people (BG Sacolick, 2009, 
April, p. 2), which is essential to the creation and maintenance of an enduring state 
(USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 9).  Although the widespread use of military force is 
frowned upon as a default action, at times it is required to build and reinforce the HN 
morale and will to fight.  
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In contrast, traditional warfare requires neither a homegrown solution nor a 
particular focus on the populace.  In fact, it is generally assumed that, “The indigenous 
populations within the operational area are non-belligerents and will accept whatever 
political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate 
(USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 8). 
3. Develop a Population-Centric Approach 
The environment that IW represents is not new; it has historically shaped warfare 
as competing entities struggle for legitimacy and influence over people.  As mentioned 
above, the population can be mostly ignored in traditional warfare, but “IW focuses on 
the control of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territories” 
(United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, pp. I–6).  The relevant population must be 
understood to the degree that is required to support internal change with respect to its 
governance.  This concept is explained by David Kilcullen in his 2009 book, The 
Accidental Guerilla.  In short, he demonstrates that understanding the population is the 
key to developing control.  Without the support of the population, the insurgents will be 
less able to operate within a given area for a protracted amount of time.  Thus, as stated 
above, support of the population is vital to success.  When enemy-centric approaches are 
adopted within the IW environment, they are often counterproductive and tend to alienate 
the population.  Knowing they are being hunted, insurgents will go into hiding, and the 
“innocent” population inadvertently becomes the recipient of direct military action and 
collateral damage, which further alienates them from the U.S. and strengthens the 
insurgency (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 32).  
In order to utilize a population-centric approach, particular attention must be 
given to each geographical area within the host nation in order to prevent categorizing all 
relevant populations as the same.  Each ethnic, religious, tribal, provincial, or other key 
divisional group  may require a different approach to the overarching population-centric 
campaign plan to gain or maintain the desired control level as it relates to the individual 
sects of the population.  
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The Joint definition of key terrain is, “Any locality, or area, the seizure or 
retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant” (United States Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2008, p. 303).   In traditional warfare, key terrain is typically that position 
on the ground from which it is easiest to control or defeat the adversary.  However, 
within IW, key terrain is best thought of as population since their support is what 
provides a force a marked advantage.  
4. Region Requires Long-Term Commitment 
With growing trans-national terror organizations operating throughout the world 
and with a focus on ungoverned or under-governed areas, it is in the best long-term 
interests for the U.S. to help others defeat threats before they grow.  In an article 
addressing the doctrinal and most effective role of Army Special Forces, BG Bennett 
Sacolik said Special Forces (SF) Soldiers “assist the indigenous security forces of 
troubled countries and to build their capacity to defeat terrorism before these conditions 
become a threat to our country [emphasis added]” (2009, April, p. 2).  If we fail to 
address these problems, we risk allowing the threat to grow to the point where 
confronting it is deemed vital to our national interests.  At this point, our strategic option 
to use a small force and a long-term approach risks being reduced as U.S. domestic 
pressures may force politicians to use a large force in hopes of a “quick fix.”   
As with most IW concepts, this “fix it early” approach is not new.  In his 1999 
paper on Regional Engagement, COL (Ret.) Hy Rothstein, PhD, advanced the benefits of 
“Continuous and proactive regionally oriented military activities conducted to gather 
information or influence international conditions in order to protect or advance United 
States national security interests abroad” (1999, p. 4). 
Traditional warfare seeks to defeat an adversary in the least amount of time 
possible through the use of overwhelming military might.  Success in traditional warfare 
typically comes by directly attacking the enemy to either destroy him, or force him to 
surrender—in other words, there is a definitive end point.  The approach and end point 
differ in the IW realm because threats are best defeated using an indirect approach of 
home-grown and population-centric solutions that deny the enemy the support of the 
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population.  This indirect approach requires a long-term focus through which 
relationships are built, cooperation fostered, and success realized. 
5. Increase Capacity of Host Nation Security Forces 
In order to legitimize the host nation in the eyes of its people and the international 
community, it is imperative to utilize the host nation’s security forces to secure both their 
physical borders and the population.   Successfully accomplishing this security mission is 
vital to long-term success as there can be no effective governance without security.   
Due to the rise in threats from transnational terrorist and criminal organizations, 
the security forces of some nations are inadequate.  As the IW JOC explains, “many 
states are unable or unwilling to exercise control over their territory or frontiers, leaving 
them open to exploitation (emphasis added)” (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 11).   
In some instances, this inability or unwillingness may come from an absence of a 
legitimate and capable security force, or as seen in Iraq, an existing apparatus may have 
been dismantled or significantly depleted.   
When indigenous security forces are “unable or unwilling,” we must have the 
foresight to help build their capacity to defeat terrorism “before these conditions become 
a threat to our country” (BG Sacolick, 2009, April, p. 2).  Developing this increased 
capability within an “unable” host nation security force is preferred for U.S. intervention 
because the willingness to improve already exists.  On the other hand, an “unwilling” 
state or security force is the most difficult situation because any action by outside forces 
will be viewed as an imposed versus a home-grown solution.  As evidenced by the U.S.-
led coalition’s recent experiences in Iraq, dismantling and rebuilding security forces 
should only be considered as a last resort.   
In traditional warfare, we seek to defeat an adversary’s military forces through 
direct application of military might.  The war is over when the enemy’s military is 
ineffective.  Conversely, IW seeks to defeat an adversary through the use of the host 
nation’s capabilities, amplified by support from the U.S.; it is over when the host nation 
has the unilateral capability to secure its borders and population and its governing 
 
 25
structure is functional and viewed as legitimate through its own population.  Success in 
the IW environment directly relates to the degree by which the host nation can utilize its 
security forces to secure both its borders and population.   
6. Increase Capacity of Host Nation Essential Services 
All societies require varying levels of essential services, and governments are 
expected to provide an acceptable standard of living for the people.  These include food, 
potable water, power, waste management, medical care, education, law enforcement, etc., 
(USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. C–4).  If the state fails to provide adequate essential 
services it opens an avenue for insurgents to exploit, and win the support of, or even 
legitimacy amongst, the population (key terrain).   
Perhaps the most relevant example of this can be found in the Gaza Strip and 
West Bank.  After more than 50 years of conflict, the Israel-Palestinian peace process 
slowly transformed the terrorist Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to the state-
like Palestinian Authority (PA) (Makovsky, 1996, pp. 2, 8–9).  As the PA attempted to 
exert control over Gaza and the West Bank, its inability to provide essential services, 
such as hospitals and post-Israeli attack reconstruction assistance, allowed the still-
extremist terrorist group HAMAS to supplant them as the state-like actor in the region 
(Mishal & Sela, 2006, p. xiii).  Providing these essential services later allowed HAMAS 
to gain continued popular support as a legitimate organization, win seats in the 2006 
elections, and use legitimate political power in conjunction with their extremist 
philosophy to extend the Palestinian issue. 
In other regions, this lack of essential services by the host nation provides a 
starting point for extremist groups’ information operations against the host nation.  
Understanding how terrorists use essential services to garner support and the long term 
nature of IW, Secretary Gates said: 
Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be 
subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, 
economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the 
grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It 
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will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to 
discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies. (Gates, 
2009) 
In Traditional Warfare, essential services (hospitals, water treatment facilities, 
etc.) are often neglected and not considered acceptable targets because of the effect they 
have on the population.  Essential services that directly support the enemy’s military (as 
opposed to the general population), or those used by the enemy in violation of the Law of 
Armed Conflict, may be targeted in order to increase the likelihood of his defeat.  In IW, 
essential services are seen as a key line of operation through which to gain the support of 
the population, the key terrain, and increase the host nation government’s legitimacy.  
7. Do Not Rely Solely on Military Force for Success 
IW is an environment in which “the decisive effort is rarely military” (United 
States Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2009, p. Preface), and as 
seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, an emphasis on military force may even hinder success 
because the military may be viewed as an occupying force instead of liberators (United 
States Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 2–11).  Within IW lie underlying social and 
political issues that, if allowed to fester, can be manipulated by adversaries in order to 
gain or maintain an advantage.  Military force is necessary to provide initial security and 
degrade an enemy’s ability to act, but it is not, on its own, sufficient to solve the 
problems that enabled the adversaries to gain a footing within the population.  
The greatest challenge to the U.S. military is achieving initial U.S. objectives, and 
then transferring leadership roles to the HN as soon as they are capable.  This critical 
shift of power, if done improperly, can be seen as an externally-manipulated arrangement 
instead of a home-grown solution.  This may cause the solution to either fail or simply be 
seen as temporary, “because many governments…resent U.S. interference in their 
internal affairs or cannot, because of domestic public opinion, accept direct U.S. counter-
terrorism assistance, making overtly U.S. controlled or funded approaches unacceptable” 
(Kilcullen, 2009, p. 15). 
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Even the Army’s main field manual on operations, FM 3–0, differentiates 
traditional from Irregular Warfare.  It states that IW is about political power, not military 
supremacy, and that in this role, “military forces can create the conditions for the other 
instruments of national power to exert their influence.”  Additionally, the manual focuses 
on avoiding direct military confrontations, and instead, use “indirect [and] 
unconventional methods” (United States Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 2–8). 
C. IW ORGANIZATIONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The identification of the key operational-environmental factors necessary to 
succeed in the IW environment requires analysis.  The understanding that combating 
threats in the IW environment are different from in the conventional warfare environment 
was alluded to by the Joint Forces Command in April 2009, when they responded to a 
request by the European Command (EUCOM) to improve their ability to defeat irregular 
threats, (Inside Washington Publishers, 2009).  This section identifies organizational (i.e., 
internal) critical success factors that enable organizations to excel in IW.      
1. Focus on Enhancing HN Legitimacy 
The organization has to understand their focus is to support the host nation 
government.  Relating back to the operational-environment factors, organizations in the 
IW environment must help develop homegrown solutions that are focused on the target 
population, utilize the internal security forces, and bolster essential services.  This 
focuses the primary effort on other-than-military force and supports both the U.S. and 
HN long-term interests.  General George W. Casey Jr., the Chief of Staff of the Army, 
furthered this concept by saying that most nations we work with are, “not going to be in a 
position where they can be openly seen with American Soldiers running around the 
country” (GEN Casey, 2009, p. 18).  
U.S. Army FM 3.0 (Operations), in describing counter-insurgency operations, 
states that, “Operations should reflect and promote the host-nation government’s 
authority.  This undermines insurgent attempts to establish an alternative authority. It also 
reduces the tendency of the population to view the units conducting counterinsurgency as 
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an occupying force (emphasis added)” (United States Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 
2–11).  Success relies not only on understanding this concept, which the U.S. military has 
demonstrated, but in the proper implementation of its principles.  As discussed 
previously, while these concepts and principles are not new, “implementing them 
effectively would be” (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 114).  
2.  Develop Regional Focuses  
Regionally focused organizations are best able to tailor solutions by 
understanding and incorporating local or regional norms.  As Kilcullen states, “There are 
many forms of intervention, and choosing how to intervene—ideally in such a way as to 
minimize local backlash—is just as critical as deciding to intervene in the first place” 
(2009, p. 37).  
The Department of the Army recognized the need for increased cultural and 
language in its “Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict.”  This concept paper 
recommended, among other things, that traditional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) be 
designated during the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle as Security 
Cooperation BCTs (SC BCT) which, “when formed, will be regionally allocated to 
ensure appropriate training focus on the culture and institutions for the region within 
which they will operate” (United States Department of the Army, 2008, p. 22).  Further 
building on this concept, the Army announced in April 2009 that it was forming the first 
of several “Advise and Assist” BCTs (A&A BCT) with a training plan that incorporates 
regional focus (Brannen, 2009).   While a good step, the SC BCT and A&A BCT 
concepts are currently only designated for one deployment cycle, which is too short of a 
focus to obtain true regional knowledge.  
This short-term focus by BCTs is important, and may be used out of necessity 
(i.e., for one deployment cycle); however, deep regional, cultural, and language 
understanding only comes after years of study.  This is best supported by a long term 




repetitive interaction also leads to the development of effective and personal relationships 
based on trust, respect and the sharing of a common goal—the betterment of the host 
nation.  This will ultimately satisfy long-term U.S. regional objectives. 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullen acknowledges that 
units must understand the complex tribal environment if they are to succeed (McMichael, 
2009, May).  Cultural understanding and the knowledge needed to deal with the complex 
tribal networks requires time to develop.  Training is important, but actual experience on 
the ground and immersion in the environment is essential to the development of a level of 
understanding that can be used to formulate effective, long-term solutions.  This concept 
is addressed in the Army’s new manual, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24.2), 
where they show time spent in an environment allows a transition from cultural 
awareness, to understanding, and finally, expertise (United States Department of the 
Army, 2009, pp. 1–24).  
Figure 2.   Changes in Cultural Capability over Time 
3. Reinforce Relationship Building 
In many parts of the world, power and prestige are tied less to the position, and 
more to the relationships, an individual has: Sometimes it is not what you know, but who 
you know, that counts.  Relationships can provide an avenue to implement strategy.  
Kilcullen illustrates how to find effective local leaders in his Sunni Awakening case 
study.  Essentially, he explains how local sheiks who have spheres of influence in 
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multiple areas (religious, tribal, business, government, criminal, police) are more apt to 
be able to help, than those who have fewer spheres of influence (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 158).   
The interjection of U.S. forces into an area will be better received and more 
effective if they have already developed a long-term relationship with the locals.  When 
necessary, relationships can be formed in short time periods, but meaningful relationships 
with local leaders oftentimes cannot be created after emergencies occur.  
As the Army attempts to develop a better way to approach the Afghanistan 
conflict, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are trying to establish plans to ensure units deploy to the 
same areas continually, albeit on shorter tours, to help develop a longer-term approach 
and to build long-lasting relationships between U.S. and local leaders.  A planning officer 
associated with this remarked, “One potential outcome of this approach—as we have 
seen with such success with [special operations forces], is that the names and faces are 
familiar. In this part of the world, relationships matter most” (McMichael, 2009, May, p. 
8).   
4. Maintain a Long-Term Focus 
The requirement for regionally focused and relationship-based solutions can only 
be achieved by also having a long term focus on success.  This requires the organization 
to disengage from the western concept of immediate gratification.  Unfortunately, the 
advent of high-technology and precision-guided weapons allowed the U.S. to conduct 
Operation Desert Storm and the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 with lightning speed; this 
short-term, “quick fix,” approach is appropriate as it was used in a conventional fight.  
However, it is counterproductive when the environment changes to a civil war or 
insurgency. Countering an insurgent threat requires the understanding that, “IW 
historically has required a prolonged and persistent effort of at least a decade to achieve a 
political outcome” (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 20).   This long-term approach is 
a key element of counterinsurgency theory, based somewhat on Mao’s concept of 
protracted conflict in which the insurgent seeks to outlast, instead of defeat, the more 
powerful opponent. Gordon McCormick explains that the guerilla only has to “stay the 
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course” because the conventional player loses if he does not win, but the guerrilla wins as 
long as he does not lose (2008). 
While discussing if the U.S.’s experience in the Philippines could be applied to 
Pakistan, Secretary Gates said, “We will move with these various countries at a pace that 
is comfortable with them,” he said. “The stronger the foundation we can build under 
these relationships, the longer they are likely to last and the more effective they are likely 
to be” (Aben, 2009).  This fundamental understanding, reinforced by the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF), must be implemented by our military to develop a long-term focus 
to all countries.  
5. Influence Through Multiple Methods  
Organizations in the IW environment must develop homegrown solutions that are 
both population-centric and account for potentially inadequate or insufficient host nation 
essential services.  This is best done by strengthening and integrating the multiple 
agencies of the U.S. government to assist the host nation.  While this is an ideal solution, 
the SECDEF has already acknowledged that, “The interagency needs to get better and 
stronger, frankly, to match our capabilities, so that our capabilities have the proper 
context in terms of the whole-government objectives” (Kruzel, 2009).  
The Taliban maintain a forceful military presence within portions of Afghanistan, 
and its true success lies in the fact that it is providing some form of consistent local 
governance and control outside of the reach of the central government.  Devenny states 
that, “Force certainly plays a part as the Taliban conquers new territory. But it’s the 
insurgents’ management structure—one that supplements rather than supplants existing 
tribal structures—that explains the Taliban’s staying power.  NATO and Kabul aren’t 
being outfought in Helmand; they’re being outgoverned” (2009).  Being “outgoverened” 
by our enemy, begs for a solution that does not rely on military force alone.  
Organizations should incorporate the applicable elements of national power to achieve 
success.   
In his briefing to the House Armed Services Committee in March 2006, Chris 
Lamb explained how, historically, the U.S. attempted to pursue national security through 
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use of either military force or other elements of national power—but rarely both.  In the 
post 9/11 world, this has changed as, “it has developed into an article of conventional 
wisdom to note that measures short of war that involve the use of force require close 
coordination of all instruments of national power.”  Further, he believes that there is 
“almost unanimous agreement on why interagency collaboration is important for national 
security and the war on terror in particular: because national security issues require the 
application of all instruments of national power to be efficiently and effectively resolved 
in our favor” (Lamb, 2006, p. 2).   
6. Operate With and Through HN Forces 
In the IW environment, developing the host nation security forces’ ability to use 
military force is critical to their internal security.  However, as mentioned previously, the 
use of military force to establish security is a necessary beginning, but not sufficient for 
long-term stability. 
The primary goal of U.S. assistance to this effort is assisting these forces, both 
military and police, to secure their borders and population.  Assisting the security forces, 
which may involve building them from scratch, must be done in a way that keeps them 
“in the lead” in order to maintain the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the 
population.  If U.S. forces fail to think through the political, credibility, and legitimacy 
sensitivities while aiding or establishing the host nation security forces, it can quickly 
lead to failure due to a lack of support from the key terrain—the population. 
The ability to increase the capacity of host nation security forces is the first step in 
securing the population.  Once basic security is established, the forces must be mentored 
and developed into an independent force that is capable of conducting unilateral 
operations that are efficient, and also respect human rights.  The only way to effectively 
mentor them is by operating through and with them.  Some of the most effective 
resources to assist in this development are the interagency partners of the U.S. 
government.  They help bring all the instruments and expertise of our national power to 
assist the host nation, but due to their civilian backgrounds, they require a certain degree 
of training and security before they can assist.   
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Assisting the host nation to build its security forces’ capacity helps that nation 
resolve its own conflicts.  However, this assistance must be provided by an organization 
that, “Clearly excels in training, leading and motivating an indigenous population of a 
troubled foreign country to prevent the next insurgency or failed state” (BG Sacolick, 
2009, Jan/Feb, p. 8).  Applying this concept of working through and with the local 
security forces in the Philippines, the lead U.S. commander said that it helps them to 
“assume ownership of the problems down there” (Barnes, 2009). 
7. Enhance Small Unit Operations 
Assisting the host nation requires all U.S. interagency elements to understand the 
legitimacy issues surrounding the HN government.  As discussed above, to avoid looking 
like an occupying power or damaging the credibility of the HN government, U.S. 
assistance must be provided by a small footprint.  The military and interagency personnel 
have to be highly trained, regionally focused, and able to build relationships that enhance 
their ability to succeed.  The concept of embassy country teams, demonstrates the 
capability of a small team focused on strategic partnership.   
Deploying a large footprint helps provide logistical and force protection support 
to the U.S. assistance effort, but it can create more problems than it solves.  Using a 
larger force can fuel the enemies’ IO that the U.S. is an occupying force and the host 
nation forces are merely U.S. proxies or surrogates.  Additionally, the host nation’s 
government and security forces lose that vital perceptibility of being credible and 
legitimate in the eyes of the population. 
Working in small teams helps reinforce the necessity of developing close working 
relationships based on trust with the host nation forces for security and support.  The 
smaller force3 increases the credibility of the assertion that the assistance is with and 
through.  However, this force must be substantial enough that, when partnered with HN 
forces, it can provide the necessary security.  This force must be able to thrive in this 
minimal-support environment and be able to operate without specific and continual 
guidance or protection provided by U.S. forces (BG Sacolick, 2009, Jan/Feb, p. 8).  
                                                 
3 The use of the term “small force” is relative to a conventional Brigade Combat Team (BCT). 
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Using their superior Soldier skills in conjunction with building on already-established 
relations for protection, the smaller force is able to be more effective at assisting the host 
nation and its security forces.  
8. Decentralize Decision Making 
An organization in the IW environment must be able to trade operational control 
of its subordinate elements in exchange for increased effectiveness.  This concept is 
similar to the U.S. giving up control over the host nation forces in order to foster the 
local, homegrown solutions discussed previously.  Once the subordinate elements have 
the leeway to operate using commander’s intent and initiative, they will be much more 
effective (McMichael, 2009, June). 
While “letting go” may be hard, many have argued for flexible and adaptive 
forces combined with “a decentralized and de-layered command and control structure” 
(Wilner, 2005, p. 15).  Allowing assistance forces to make key decisions shifts them from 
a top-down organization to more decentralized and bottom-up organization.  
Additionally, providing the lower level commanders the authority to make decisions 
increases their credibility to make agreements with local leaders, thus increasing their 
effectiveness. 
In their book, The Starfish and the Spider, Brafman and Beckstrom use several 
relevant examples to show the effectiveness of fighting decentralized organizations with 
another decentralized organization (2007, pp. 140–142).  Given that the primary threat in 
the IW environment comes from decentralized organizations like local insurgencies, 
trans-national terrorist and criminal groups, this ability to operate without continual 
guidance is critical. 
9. Foster Innovation and Creativity 
Small units that operate in a decentralized manner and rely on their host nation 
counterparts for force protection, logistical capabilities, and overall success must be 
resourceful.  To do this, they must incorporate the concept of thinking “outside of the 
box” to identify the problem and determine a viable solution without relying on the 
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traditional support from U.S. military organizations and capabilities.  This means the 
small units should be both innovative and creative at problem solving. 
Organizations and key interagency partners must be innovative and creative when 
operating in the IW environment.  They must incorporate cultural attributes when 
developing solutions that bolster the inadequate or non-existent essential services 
mentioned previously.  Like in the security realm, imposing a U.S. solution will not work 
if HN legitimacy is to be gained or maintained, but the interagency partners can integrate 
both the elements of U.S. national power with local charities and NGOs.  This multi-
pronged approach helps the host nation solve its own problems, increase its credibility 
and legitimacy, and garner increased support from the population. 
10. Focus Rewards System on Long-Term Effects 
We believe one of the most important organizational-environmental success 
factors is that organizations operating within the IW environment must have a long-term 
focused rewards system.  The rewards and promotion system must be designed to 
recognize and reward efforts whose results may not be fully realized until months or 
years later.  While this change is necessary for success in the IW environment, it is not 
sufficient only to change an organization’s rewards system. 
This long-term focus is in direct opposition to the current rewards and promotion 
system of the U.S. military, which is designed around 12-month evaluation report cycles, 
6–18 month deployment cycles, and 2–4 years time-on-station unit assignment cycles.  
These evaluation and reward systems are designed to show the effectiveness of 
individuals and organizations in “completing the mission” and ensuring that the most 
qualified and effective personnel are advanced in rank.  The current organizational 
culture of the U.S. military has translated this task into a listing of quantifiable 
accomplishments that do not reflect the qualitative nature of IW.   
The measures of effectiveness (MoE) used by the military tend to be enemy-
centric and geared toward easily quantifiable metrics (i.e., numbers of killed and 
captured).  This approach does not meet the requirements within the IW environment.  
Understanding this, commanders in the successful IW campaign in the Philippines (OEF-
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P), developed a population-centric rating scheme for judging the success of their 
operations within a given area.  It did not measure numbers of killed, captured, etc., but 
instead rated the effects of their operations as they related to the populace.  Much 
emphasis was given to the population’s perception of the government and the operations 
being conducted.  Additionally, the overall legitimacy of the government was rated using 
various standards that were developed in synchronization with cultural norms and 
behaviors.  These measures are not easy to develop, but they are feasible and essential if 
success is going to be realized (Maxwell, 2009).   
Measuring the operational effects, as was done in the Philippines, is a step in the 
right direction.  This needs to be taken a step further, though; rewards and evaluations of 
the personnel operating in this environment must be set up to reward and solidify these 
practices as a part of the organizational culture.  
D. SUMMARY 
IW is an extremely complex, long-duration, and population-centric environment, 
which requires a different form of organization to operate efficiently and effectively.  As 
shown throughout this chapter, IW differs greatly from traditional warfare, in which our 
military is currently designed and organized to Excel.  Although many differences exist, 
the population-centric versus enemy-centric focus stands out as the dominant one.  
Control over the relevant population is the basis of all the other differences.   
Joint Publication (JP) 3.0 states that “warfare that has the population as its ‘focus 
of operations’ requires a different mindset and different capabilities than warfare that 
focuses on defeating an adversary militarily” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, 
pp. I–6).  Thus, organizations designed to conduct conventional warfare are sub-optimal 
to those specially designed and organized specifically for the IWE. 
Although General Purpose Forces have demonstrated their ability to conduct 
important IW activities like stability operations and FID, their enemy-oriented 
organizational culture, large footprint, core competencies, and rewards systems inhibit 
efficiency.  These organizational aspects limit fundamental changes required to operate 
effectively in the IWE.  The IWE requires a dynamic organization in which indirect and 
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long-term approaches are favored to help the host nation gain legitimacy in the eyes of 
the relevant population.  In this environment, an emphasis on military might and force 
will have both a short and counterproductive effect.  
These seven operational-environmental and ten organizational-environmental 
critical success factors, shown in Table 2, provide a glimpse of what an organization must 
be able to take into account when operating in the IW environment.  We will use the 
environments discussed thus far, in conjunction with organizational theory and design, to 
establish the organizational principles necessary for DoD to maintain an equilibrium 
between traditional and irregular warfare.   
 
Operational-Environment Organizational-Environment 
Account for U.S. and Host Nation Political 
Situation Focus on Enhancing HN Legitimacy 
Foster a Home Grown Solution Develop Regional Focuses 
Develop a Population-Centric Approach Reinforce Relationship Building 
Region Requires Long term Commitment Maintain a Long term Focus 
Increase Capacity of Host Nation Security 
Forces Influence through Multiple Methods 
Increase Capacity of Host Nation Essential 
Services Operate With and Through HN Forces 
Do not rely Solely on Military Force for 
Success Enhance Small Unit Operations 
 Decentralize Decision Making 
 Foster Innovation and Creativity 
 Focus Rewards System on Long term Effects 
Table 2.   Irregular Warfare Critical Success Factors 
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND DESIGN OVERVIEW 
It requires, in those situations where we encounter it, a whole new 
strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore, a new and wholly 
different kind of military training.  
–President John F. Kennedy, 1962 USMA Commencement Address 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we introduce the basics of organization theory to identify the 
domains used in our analysis.  We then incorporate the operational and organizational 
critical success factors developed in Chapter III and discuss their implications for 
organizations operating within the IW environment. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND DESIGN IMPLICATIONS IN IW 
In this section, we focus on five domains that frame our organizational analysis:  
1. Structure 
2. Environment 
3. Work Processes 
4. Human Resources 
5. Culture  
We then determine the implications that these domains have on organizations 
operating in the IW environment by explaining which environmental success factors 
apply and why they are crucial to success.   
Structure, work processes, human resources and culture are analyzed using the 
organizational success factors to explain what should happen within the organization.  
The environmental factors describe the forces affecting the organization and will be used 
to analyze the organizational theory principle—environment. 
1. Structure 
The DoD was designed and organized to operate within the traditional warfare 
environment.  This is an environment in which centralized decision making and 
mechanistic structures can operate efficiently and effectively.  The IW environment, as 
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established in Chapters II and III, differs from traditional warfare in being more complex 
and dynamic.  For an organization to thrive within the IW environment, an entirely 
different structure is required.    
How an organization is designed to facilitate information flow and complete its 
work (tasks) defines its structure (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007, pp. 124–125).  While 
the end result appears as the boxes and lines of an organizational chart, structure is more 
realistically viewed as a combination of vertical and horizontal linkages between the 
subordinate elements (Daft, 2003, pp. 125–126).   
The basic components defining an organization’s structure are: Formalization 
(standardization of training and work processes), Centralization (of decision-making 
authority), Specialization and Complexity (of workers’ tasks), Hierarchy (reporting 
system), Span of Control (number of subordinates reporting to a single manager), and 
Rules (ensuring coordination and consistency for repetitious situations) (Daft, 2003, p. 
48).   
The vertical linkages coordinate the actions of the workers in line with the 
leader’s goals and provide those leaders with information on how the work or tasks are 
being performed.  Among other things, vertical linkages include dividing tasks and sub-
organizations into different departments; establishing the hierarchy and spans of control; 
and establishing rules and plans to formalize everything from training to ensuring a 
consistent response to repetitive tasks or situations without continually providing 
guidance.  The horizontal linkages are designed to ensure communication flows between 
the individual departments in the organization (Daft, 2003, pp. 126–129).  These include 
utilizing a combination of information systems, including computers and varying levels 
of liaisons to ensure unity of effort.  In general, the more standardized or routine the work 
is, the more vertical linkages will prevail.  The more complex the work is, the more 
horizontal linkages will prevail (Daft, 2003, pp. 126–129). 
The departmentation of an organization is its most visible structural component, 
and can be Functional, Divisional, or Matrix.  Generally speaking, a functional structure 
is used to centralize expertise in certain functions together.  Within the DoD, the 
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functional commands are: Strategic Command (STRATCOM), Transportation Command 
(TRANSCOM), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) (United States Department of Defense, 2009, p. 2.9).  This is because they 
have worldwide responsibility for their areas.  Divisional structures are used when an 
organization has varying products, customers, or geographic locations to serve.  The 
divisional commands within DoD are the six Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) 
that maintain responsibility for all operations within their assigned areas.  A matrix 
organization combines both functional experts with divisionally focused organizations to 
build a team serving two bosses.  An example of this structure is a Theater Special 
Operations Command (TSOC) where USSOCOM personnel (a functional command) 
operate in a specific geographical area under a GCC (a divisional command).  The 
TSOCs work and report for both headquarters. 
a. Structural Implications for IW 
Applying the organizational success factors from Chapter III, an 
organization operating in the IW environment must develop a regional focus, the ability 
to influence the host nation through multiple methods (i.e., interagency approach), 
enhance small unit operations, and be empower decentralized decision making.   
The regional focus allows the organization to create institutional and 
personal expertise in the areas it operates.  In accordance with organization theory, this 
suggests that the organization has a divisional structure for its subordinate elements based 
on the regions they serve. 
Incorporating all capabilities of the U.S. government, through an 
interagency approach, allows the organization to exert influence through multiple 
methods.  Organization theory suggests that this need for multiple agencies operating 
together requires multiple liaisons and increased horizontal linkages.  Combining these 
integrated teams together also helps create more organic, open and free-flowing 
organizations (Galbraith, Downey, & Kates, 2002, pp. 138–141). 
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Enabling the organization to enhance small-unit operations requires an 
integrated human resources approach that includes a highly formalized selection, 
education, and training process.  This produces professional, educated, and highly trained 
workers who increase the capability of the organization to work in a complex 
environment without requiring continual guidance and support from a higher 
headquarters. 
Finally, these small units operating independently can only be empowered 
to be successful if the organization supports decentralized decision making.  This relates 
to a structure that has as few vertical linkages as possible, minimizing the intermediary 
levels of bureaucracy found in other organizations. 
2. Environment 
An organization’s environment is defined as, “All elements that exist outside the 
boundary of the organization and have the potential to affect all or part of [it]” (Daft, 
2003, p. 48).  Daft further divides the environment into two dimensions: simple versus 
complex and stable versus unstable (2003, p. 52).   
The IW environment is highly complex, interactive and continually changing.  
Organizational theory suggests that an organization operating within such an environment 
must be both decentralized in its decision making, and organic in its structure. 
A simple environment only has a few external influences on it, while a complex 
environment has many. Complex environments tend to favor decentralized decision 
making so that constantly shifting problems do not overwhelm higher-level decision 
makers (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 101).   
The environment’s stability refers to the frequency of change in these external 
influences, so stable environments have predictable influences over long durations, while 
unstable environments experience continually shifting influences.  Unstable or hostile 
environments tend to favor organic structures that are “looser, free-flowing, and 
adaptive” (Daft, 2003, p. 58). 
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In combining these two dimensions, the more complex and unstable the 
environment, the more uncertainty the organization experiences.   This affects the 
organization’s ability to process incoming information, risks overloading its decision-
making abilities, and makes efficiency much more difficult (Jansen, 2009a).  A visual 
representation of this concept is illustrated in Figure 3 and shows that decentralized 
decision making is better suited for complex environments, and organic structures are 
better for unstable environments (Daft, 2004, p. 152).   
 
Figure 3.   Environmental Effects on Organizations 
a. Environment’s Implications in IW 
Using the environmental success factors developed in Chapter III, all 
seven4 of the operational-environment factors meet Daft’s definition of existing outside 
the organization’s boundary but having the ability to affect either parts or the whole of it.  
                                                 
4 Seven operational-environmental critical success factors from Chapter III are: Account for U.S. & 
host nation political situation; foster a homegrown solution; develop a population-centric approach; region 
requires long-term commitment; increase capacity of host nation security forces; increase capacity of host 
nation essential services; do not rely solely on military force for success. 
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Thus, any organization operating in the IW environment must incorporate these critical 
success factors into its guiding principles in order to be successful.  The difficult, unique, 
and constantly changing aspects of the IW environment make it both unstable and highly 
complex.  This high level of uncertainty lends itself to organizations that are both 
decentralized in their decision making, and less bureaucratic organizational structures.   
The organization design concepts explained above would classify most 
military organizations as machine bureaucracies due to their mechanistic (formalized) 
structures and reliance on centralized decision making.  These characteristics hamper an 
organization’s ability to succeed in the IW environment. 
3. Work Processes 
The reason any organization exists is to transform some “input” or raw material 
into some “output.”  In a business environment, this is akin to the transformation from 
raw materials to an end product, like a car.  An organization’s technology comprises the 
“tools, techniques, and actions” it uses during the transformation process, and it includes 
the technical systems (physical infrastructure and machinery used), and the work process 
itself (Daft, 2003, p. 73).  
The IW environment requires personnel working within it to deal with non-
routine, complex, and interdependent tasks.  To accomplish their missions, organization 
theory suggests it is best accomplished by minimizing formalization of job 
accomplishment, incorporating extensive training and experience requirements for 
workers, increasing span of control for leaders, and ensuring unity of effort through 
extensive horizontal linkages between groups. 
An effective organization is designed so the multiple steps, or tasks, that must be 
accomplished within the transformation process are as efficient as possible.  When the 
tasks are evaluated, each has a unique level of variety and analyzability.  A high task 
variety indicates frequent, unexpected events throughout the transformation process, and 
a low analyzability indicates the process cannot be reduced to simple, mechanistic, and 
repetitive steps (Perrow, 1970, pp. 76–77).  The more varied and less analyzable a 
transformation process’ tasks are, the more non-routine the work process.  Therefore, the 
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organization operates with increased uncertainty.  It then follows that, the more non-
routine the work, the greater the need for workers who have the experience and technical 
knowledge required to solve problems while dealing with the uncertainty. 
Another component to the work process accomplished by an organization is the 
level of interdependence between departments within an organization.  If a product 
(output) is transformed independently of other groups, as in a divisional organization, 
Thompson refers to the process as being pooled (independent) or sequential 
interdependence (Thompson, 1967, p. 54).  However, if the transformation requires the 
interaction of multiple elements within different sub-organizations, Thompson refers to 
the process as reciprocal interdependence.  This continual interaction between sub-
organizations is similar to the work found in functional organizations where expertise is 
maintained in different units, and they must work together to produce the output.  This 
interaction requires extensive horizontal linkages in the form of liaisons to coordinate 
activities. These non-routine work processes that utilize interdependent horizontal sub-
organizations are best accomplished in organic structures with: low formalization 
(standardization) of work processes, decentralized decision making, extensive training 
and experience requirements for workers, fairly moderate span of control of subordinates, 
but extensive horizontal linkages between groups to ensure unity of effort (Daft, 2004, 
pp. 159–160). 
a. Work Process Implications in IW 
The increase in uncertainty in the IW environment requires the personnel 
operating within it to have enhanced small unit operations, maintain a long-term focus, 
develop relationship-based operations, operate through and with the host nation’s forces, 
influence through multiple agencies, be innovative and creative, and be empowered by 
decentralized decision making.  These requirements reinforce the need for extensive 




The reliance on multiple sub-organizations working together to achieve 
success in the IW environment leads to reciprocal interdependence amongst them and the 
host nation forces.  In this type of environment, organizations that are able to build 
relationships with their counterparts and interagency partners are more likely to succeed.  
When supporting a host nation to build or maintain their legitimacy, it is 
imperative to respect and allow them to build their own formalized work processes.  
Operating with and through the host nation’s forces allows them to develop work 
processes that they are a “fit” for their culture.   
The need for trained personnel with expertise and technical knowledge in 
environments with high uncertainty requires a long-term focus by organizations in the IW 
environment.  When building reciprocal interdependence between U.S. and HN elements, 
a long-term focus enables the required horizontal linkages to formalize. 
The complex and unstable environment also requires organizations to 
influence our host nation partners through multiple methods.  No single sub-organization 
will bring about the desired endstate, and they all must work together, in reciprocal 
interdependence, in order to succeed.  Additionally, the multiple sub-organizations must 
be enabled by decentralized decision-making power so precious time is not wasted 
waiting for the higher headquarters to receive, review, and approve plans.  
In the IW environment, organizations must be resourceful in order to deal 
with the ever-changing situation.  To deal effectively with this, organizations and 
personnel require extensive training, experience, and small group ingenuity to accomplish 
complex tasks with minimal guidance or support. 
4. Human Resources 
The human resources (HR) component of any organization is the critical link 
between knowing what “has” to be done, and enabling people so they “can” get it done.  
In general, incorporating HR into the design of an organization involves four 
components: Selecting the right people, Training them to accomplish the work, 
Placement in a job or position best suited to match their talents with the organizations 
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goals, and a Reward System to reinforce positive behavior through promotion and 
retention (Jansen, 2009b).  If not designed appropriately, these HR functions can cause a 
“misfit” between the people and the organization, which may eventually lead to failure. 
When selecting the right person, the recruitment function aims to ensure that the 
required aptitudes and abilities needed for the work are demonstrated by the recruit.  For 
example, the military has basic physical condition (height and weight) and ability (fitness 
tests) requirements.  Additionally, how recruits are attracted to a job should later be 
incorporated into how they are evaluated (Von Glinow, Driver, Brousseau, & Prince, 
1983, p. 25).  Recruiting a computer expert to join the Army despite a lack of physical 
fitness or ability, and then evaluating him on fitness, will quickly lead to problems. 
Once selected, the worker must be trained to accomplish the required tasks.  This 
also introduces the first step of the rewards system, defining what is considered good 
behavior.  Reinforcing what “right looks like” helps ensure desired results later. 
Once trained, the worker must be placed in a job that maximizes his or her utility 
to the organization and satisfies internal expectations and desires.  This can be defined as: 
do they have the ability to do the job? Are they motivated to do the job? Do their 
expectations about the successful end state match the organizations? 
Finally, the worker must be rewarded for the work.  This can be defined as, “A 
complex set of formal and informal incentives that connect individual motivation, 
behavior, performance, and ultimately results to the various forms of pay or 
compensation received in exchange” (CoastWise Consulting, Inc., 2009).  This reward 
system must help motivate the worker to do the work needed by the organization.  A 
failure to connect the desired work with the reward system, the less-desirable behavior 
will emerge (Kerr, 1995, p. 13).  While it is true that some workers gain intrinsic rewards 
from their work, unfair or inconsistent rewards system can erode this satisfaction and 
reinforce undesired behaviors.  In other words, the rewards should provide positive 
reinforcement, not an obstacle, to achieving the organization’s desired behavior (Kerr, 
1995, p. 13).  Effective rewards systems establish a cycle of defining acceptable or 
desired behavior through setting of goals and expectations; identifying good or desired 
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behavior during performance appraisals; and rewarding desired behaviors with feedback 
that may include bonuses, pay raises, promotions, prestige or status symbols, job security 
and benefits, or increased influence in the organization (Kerr, 2009).   
A failure to incorporate the attributes used to recruit workers into their evaluations 
and rewards will likely lead to career problems (Von Glinow, Driver, Brousseau, & 
Prince, 1983, p. 24).  Likewise, basing rewards on quantifiable measures of evaluation in 
a qualitative environment, or attempting to focus only visible measures of success when 
other measures are more important to the organization, will lead to a mismatch between 
what the organization is rewarding the worker to do, and what they want him or her to do 
(Kerr, 1995, p. 12). 
a. Human Resource’s Implications in IW 
Understanding the HR domain of an organization is critical.  The military 
has developed a long-standing ability to select, train, place and reward its members who 
are operating in the traditional warfare environment, but it has failed to do so for the IW 
environment.  The following critical success factors are essential to HR: reinforce 
relationship building, operate with and through the host nation’s forces, enhance small 
unit operations, foster innovation and creativity, and decentralize decision making. 
To enable the organization to keep a regional focus, personnel must be 
selected by their aptitude to learn languages, trained to recognize and understand nuances 
in different regions, and then placed in units that can take advantage of these skills.   
Personnel conducting operations within IW should be recognized and 
rewarded based on their skills and performance at developing and maintaining 
relationship-based interactions with partner nations. 
Training personnel to operate with and through the partner nation’s forces 
is a critical first step in building the capacity of that nation.  The focus should be on 
increasing the host nation’s performance.  The personnel reward systems for 
organizations within IW should be related to the degree of improvement in the host 
nation’s capabilities. 
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Selecting, training and rewarding personnel who are able to effectively 
operate in small units is necessary to allow a small footprint in the partner nation.  While 
this helps to maintain that nation’s legitimacy, it increases the complexity of conducting 
operations without a robust command and support structure. 
An integrated requirement to operate effectively in small units is the 
power to make decentralized decisions and be resourceful.  Organizations must train their 
personnel not to be dependent on higher headquarters or support structures to accomplish 
missions.  Then, those personnel who, to use the cliché, “think outside of the box,” 
should be recognized and rewarded to encourage others to do the same.   
These criteria are the “good behaviors” as they relate to the IW 
environment.  Once established, metrics should be developed and implemented that 
enable a qualitative assessment of achievements from the individual to organizational 
levels.  This will require a long-term focused reward system vice the immediate results 
system currently being utilized.  
5. Culture 
One of the hardest things to define is an organization’s culture.  Merriam-Webster 
defines it as, “The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes 
an institution or organization.”  Although an organization’s mission defines its purpose 
for existence, its culture reflects what it values most.  In fact, an organization’s culture 
can grow so strong that “it is best referred to as an ‘ideology’ that dominates all else” 
(Quinn, Mintzberg, & James, 1988, p. 344).  This ideology is the compilation of the 
organization’s structure, work processes, and HR practices.  If the organization is not 
careful, the mission and culture will be out of sync, and its efficiency will be deteriorated. 
An organization should foster a culture that is able to operate in the IW 
environment by instituting effective HR policies that provide direction and enable 
success.  Leaders must identify, prescribe, and reinforce what “good” is, to the point that 
it becomes normal behavior within the organization.  The “good” behavior cannot be the 
exception.  Instead, it must be the norm if success is to be realized. 
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Missions designed to produce quantifiable results (e.g., kill or capture missions) 
are inherently favored within DoD.  Additionally, these types of missions provide 
immediate gratification to those who execute them.  However, due to its long term and 
protracted nature, success in IW may not be known for many years, offering few to no 
immediate or tangible results.   
A new metric must be adopted by the DoD that takes into account the focus of 
operations within the IWE in order to foster the desired culture.  Reward systems and 
cultures within the DoD that fail to support the requisite IW competencies, can create an 
environment where different types of warfare are required, but only one is reinforced.  
This is akin to what CoastWise Consulting found in the corporate world where, “Despite 
the fact that different parts of the organizations require different behaviors and results, 
most corporations insist that their reward systems be consistent across the organization” 
(2009).  
a. Culture’s Implications in IW 
An organization’s culture must be compatible with its primary mission, 
and will ultimately determine whether it succeeds or fails in achieving its goals.  While 
the previous components of organization design (structure, work environment, work 
process, and HR policies) are necessary for success, none of them are sufficient by 
themselves.  A failure to accomplish any of these will result in an organization that does 
not “fit” its assigned tasks.  However, if an organization incorporates the other aspects 
but fails to develop a long-term culture consistent with its missions and goals, it will still 
fail in the IW environment. 
The culture within the DoD supports advancing U.S. objectives within a 
host nation.  In IW, the culture must have a second driving force; a focus on enhancing 
the legitimacy of the host nation in order to gain or maintain influence over the relevant 
populations.  Recognizing that an organization’s culture should enable it to accomplish 
its mission, and is a product of all its components and practices, an organization must 
incorporate all of the organizational-environmental critical success factors throughout the 
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five organizational design principles.  This all-inclusive approach will develop and grow 
a culture that reinforces success in the IW environment. 
A culture that maintains and fosters the capabilities required in the IW 
environment must begin with an organization that is focused on enhancing host nation 
legitimacy.  This foundation will enable a long-term focus that requires enhanced small 
units to conduct decentralized operations while working with and through host nation 
forces.  As the relationships are built, maintained and reinforced by a reward system 
focused on long-term effects, the culture of the organization will become so strong that it 
truly represents “an ‘ideology’ that dominates all else” (Quinn, Mintzberg, & James, 
1988, p. 344). 
C. SUMMARY   
The complexities and uniqueness of IW developed in Chapters II and III led to the 
establishment of operational-environment and organizational-environment critical 
success factors affecting any organization operating within IW.  Evaluating an 
organization against the five components of organizational theory and design, (Structure, 
Environment, Work Processes, Human Resources, and Culture), shows that each element 
of the theory is necessary, but not sufficient by itself, for success in the IW environment. 
Based on organizational theory and design, there are several differences between 
traditional and irregular warfare organizations, as summarized in the Table 3.  The key 
distinction is the focus by the rewards system and organizational culture.  Traditional warfare 
organizations focus on enemy-centric, short term, and quantifiable results instead of the 
population-centric, long term and qualitative results essential in IW.  This requires a separate 
rewards system and culture for all elements working in the IW environment.  
 Irregular Warfare Traditional Warfare 
Structure Horizontal  Vertical  
Environment Complex and Unstable  Simple and Stable 
Work Processes Non routine Routine 
HR Reward Focus Long term  Immediate 
Culture Focused on HN Legitimacy Focused on defeating an enemy
Table 3.   Organizational Comparison in Differing Environments 
 52
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 53
V. IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS 
The strategy strives for balance in three areas: between trying to prevail 
in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies, between 
institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign 
military assistance and maintaining the United States' existing 
conventional and strategic technological edge against other military 
forces, and between retaining those cultural traits that have made the U.S. 
armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do 
what needs to be done. 
—Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background upon which the United 
States can best organize itself to combat threats in the IWE—ideally, by acting to prevent 
the threats from ever emerging. Of note, with the understanding that within the U.S. 
government, most, if not all, of the agencies play a role within the IWE, the DoD 
oftentimes plays the largest role.  While broad changes within the IA will be mentioned, 
the focus for this thesis will remain within DoD. 
This chapter will identify and analyze the two basic options available to 
organizations that are unable to meet the demands of the environment: create a new 
organization from scratch or improve an existing organization through reorganization.  
We begin by highlighting a business decision to improve or innovate internal processes 
based on changing needs.  This will provide a brief, conceptual introduction into options 
available in the IW environment. 
We then outline the two basic options (improve existing or innovate new) for 
establishing an organization that can excel in the IW environment.  However, the most 
important aspect of reorganization is to identify what capabilities are needed 
(organizational-environmental success factors) and what organizations or agencies 
currently provide those capabilities.  We argue that the necessary and available 
capabilities are not being used correctly.  This is similar to Professor Rothstein’s 
comment, “We have the tools but lack the blueprints for executing forms of warfare that 
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do not conform to standard warfare conventions” (2006, p. 171).  Once these assets are 
identified, the U.S. government must decide on the level of change that is required to 
meet the environmental demands. 
This chapter concludes by recommending which approach best suits the U.S., and 
highlights some key decisions that must be incorporated into establishing this 
organization. 
B. APPLICATION OF BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE: INNOVATE OR 
IMPROVE 
In discussing how a business decides on the scope of change required to maintain 
relevancy in its market, Davenport identifies two basic approaches: improve (i.e., change 
existing) or innovate (i.e., create new) (Malhotra, 1998).  The Table 4 summarizes some 
of the key considerations that, if accurately assessed, facilitate an organization’s ability to 
maintain relevancy and succeed in its current and future markets. 
 Improvement Innovation 
Level of Change Incremental Radical 
Starting Point Existing Process Clean Slate 
Frequency of Change One-time/Continuous One-Time 
Time Required Short Long 
Participation Bottom-Up Top-Down 
Typical Scope Narrow, within functions Broad, cross-functional 
Risk Moderate High 
Primary Enabler Statistical Control Information Technology 
Type of Change Cultural Cultural/Structural 
Table 4.   Business Process Improvement vs. Redesign (After Davenport, 1993, p. 11) 
Table 4 refers directly to business organizations where demands for products and 
services change often.  Businesses are focused on making money by providing those 
goods and services, so they must be adept at recognizing and responding to those 
changing conditions.  It is this requirement, to be responsive, that illustrates how this 
thought process relates to the government as it adapts to the ever-changing threat 
environment. 
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In discussing how businesses redesign themselves, Chris Worley explains the 
importance of designing organizations that are capable of handling future change, “To 
change rapidly and maintain critical configuration and dynamic alignment, organizations 
need to be designed to change and be capable of high velocity change. They need to be 
able to change elements of their strategy, competencies and capabilities, and organization 
design when the environment calls for it” (Lawler & Worley, 2006, p. 52).  The military 
is currently faced with a multitude of options to adjust its configuration to meet the 
changing threat environment.  However, these changes must be implemented judiciously 
to ensure the U.S. maintains its relevant traditional warfighting abilities.  
Businesses can change or innovate more easily than governmental organizations 
because they are not constrained by the bureaucracy inherent in government.  When 
dealing with warfare, either traditional or irregular, the “goods or services” required (i.e., 
the capability to deal with most threats within these environments) already exists, 
although they reside in multiple organizations. Within the government, leaders must 
decide the level of change that is needed by assessing what capabilities and mindsets 
currently exist, compare these to what is required, and determine what the gaps are.  
Additionally, by looking at the future of perceived threats and the known competing 
demands, the government must assess the gap between the time available to organize for 
new threats and the time required to implement changes.  Lastly, the government must 
identify the level of acceptable risk it is willing to accept while reorganizing or building 
to address these future threats. 
Utilizing current IW capabilities to reorganize existing organizations proves to be 
a much wiser course of action than creating a new organization.  While creating a new 
organization from scratch is an option in many instances, creating a new organization to 
operate within the IW environment makes little sense.  The following section will address 
many of the key attributes of this course of action which make it neither suitable nor 
feasible. 
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C. WHY INNOVATING WITH A NEW ORGANIZATION IS NOT AN 
OPTION 
The option to “innovate” relates to the establishment of a new organization from 
scratch.  For definitional purposes, this means the creation of a new headquarters element 
(either under an existing or as a separate command), and developing the forces, 
equipment, legislation, authorities and funding necessary for success.  It is important to 
clarify that this option does not borrow from, use, reorganize or transplant existing 
personnel, organizations or systems.  We outline the advantages and disadvantages of 
creation of a new organization without exploring whether it exists within or external to 
the DoD.  
Starting from scratch initially appears to be an ideal scenario because of the 
ability to fully incorporate the environmental success factors (Chapter III) with the 
organizational theory and design implications (Chapter IV) from the start.  This allows 
the new organization’s structure to be designed as a product of its operational-
environment instead of its bureaucratic environment.  Therefore, a new organization can 
be tailored to fit the IW environment without being constrained by existing organizational 
norms.  
However, designing from new overlooks the fact that both the DoD and IA 
partners already have sub-organizations with personnel specifically selected, trained, and 
equipped for the IW environment.  Therefore, creating a new organization creates a large 
duplication of existing capabilities, funding, and resources for the government and 
military.  Duplication of effort relates to more than just a duplication of operational 
capability, it also includes the resources required to select, train, and educate personnel 
for effectiveness in the IW environment. 
Another benefit to starting from scratch allows the organization to establish good 
behavior by using the proper organizational theory human resource concepts in the early 
phases of development.  This enables the organization to develop its manning by 
selecting personnel who have the aptitude and motivation to succeed in this type of 
environment.  These personnel are then trained to enhance their ability to excel through 
key personnel attributes (i.e., language proficiency, cultural understanding, educated to 
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conduct problem solving in a decentralized environment, etc.).  Once the training is 
complete, each individual is placed in the sub-organization that best utilizes their skills.  
Finally, these personnel can be rewarded to reinforce desired behaviors instead of being 
subjected to pre-existing bureaucratic values.  
However, much like the appropriate sub-organizations that already exist, the IW-
relevant human resource processes are already in place in many DoD organizations, such 
as select elements within the U.S. Marine Special Operations Advisory Group 
(MARSOAG), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Naval Special 
Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), and the United States Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC), which includes Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and 
Psychological Operations forces.  While force projections are tailored for the nature of 
current and future threats to the U.S., a duplication of the training capabilities that reside 
in these units is not only wasteful but will cause greater changes in the current roles and 
missions of these specialized units. 
Building a new organization is a costly option that requires major human and 
physical infrastructure.  Both the military and IA partners are struggling to adequately 
resource their existing requirements, and are in no position to stand start? up a new 
organization.  The creation of a new organization with duplicate capabilities will amplify 
the already existing funding fights among government agencies.  A new organization 
would duplicate the IW-relevant assets within the services and IA partners and increase 
costs without a proportional increase in operational efficiency. 
Developing a new organization provides an avenue to establish a new 
ideology/culture of good behavior without the historic shortfalls of “this is how we used 
to do it.”  While the culture of the organization can be built and strengthened by 
establishing its mission, goals and desired end states up front, the government must first 
recognize the many sub-organizations that have already done this.  The shortfalls to these 
organizations reside in their inability to institutionalize a rewards system that recognizes 
and reinforces IW capabilities. 
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If a new organization is created and resourced, it has to establish internal 
operating procedures and then begin the process of building credibility with other U.S. 
government agencies and foreign governments.  This process dramatically increases the 
time required to truly establish a new organization that can effectively do what it was 
designed for. 
Existing organizations possess area expertise and have established credibility, in 
the U.S. and abroad.  Trying to reestablish those characteristics with a new organization 
places both of those in jeopardy. 
1. Summary of Why a New Organization Is Not an Option 
The most compelling reason to build the organization from scratch is if the 
desired capabilities for the organization are currently non-existent.  The most compelling 
reason to not build an organization from scratch is the duplication of pre-existing human 
capital that possess specific capabilities and infrastructure.  Credibility of an organization 
is something that is established over time and through successes, which is a hurdle that 
would be difficult to overcome.   For these reasons, a new organization, that duplicates 
current capabilities, is not a viable option. 
An understanding of the environmental critical success factors demands the U.S. 
government reassess its current organizations that were originally purpose-built for 
operations in the IW environment. Once assessed, it is imperative to resist the urge to 
build from scratch.  The government must select the capabilities that come closest to 
meeting these requirements and reorganize them. 
D. WHY REORGANIZATION IS THE ONLY OPTION 
The option to better exploit existing capabilities through reorganization, whether 
within or external to DoD, is the only option that is viable considering the assets the U.S. 
government already possesses.  Reorganization includes: reassigning multiple sub-
organizations under one headquarters element, separating a sub-organization from a 
parent organization, or establishing a new headquarters element and populating it with 
existing sub-organizations. 
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The primary advantage of reorganization is that capabilities and resources to excel 
in the IW environment already exist.  However, the greatest issue the government faces is 
organization centrality.  The centralizing of these forces under a single organization is not 
to be confused with their need to operate decentralized.  Currently, the organizations best 
suited to operate in the IW environment are centrally managed under USSOCOM, which 
historically has favored direct over indirect approaches.  What is needed is a parent 
organization that is solely IW-focused.  As long as USSOCOM maintains both direct and 
indirect cultures, the direct culture will dominate. 
Reorganization of these specialized capabilities under one organization will 
significantly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of indirect options.  Furthermore, it 
will significantly reduce the misuse of indirect assets by enemy-centric focused 
commands.   
The bureaucratic nature of our government leads each military service or 
governmental department to try to justify their relevancy, mission, size, budget, and 
power.  While this is rational, the allocation and use of money dedicated to countering 
threats in the IWE is sub-optimal when dispersed to parent organizations that have a 
purpose and culture that is the antithesis of irregular warfare.  Reorganizing IW-relevant 
sub organizations will alleviate competing demands for status, power, and money 
throughout the military.   
The primary disadvantage of reorganizing is the comprehensive change required 
to adequately outline, recognize, and reward behavior critical to success in the IW 
environment.  This means that organizational ideologies and promotion/reward systems 
must be drastically modified to support the long-term and population-centric behaviors 
associated with proactively assisting partner nations.  
Despite the vast amount of infrastructure already in place to select, train, and 
manage personnel within these IW-focused sub-organizations, capabilities and capacity 
will never be sufficient as long as these forces are centralized under a non IW-focused 
command.  The need to create these forces is eliminated by effectively reorganizing the 
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existing capabilities under a central organization.  The end result is an organization with 
sufficient capability and orientation to meet the demands of the IW environment. 
The need to use military force to provide and maintain security in areas of 
conflict, as well as a shortage of critical IA partners, has placed the DoD in the lead 
during previous IW campaigns.  Organizational changes to better direct IW-focused 
actions increase effectiveness of the applicable DoD forces while enhancing the 
coordination with those limited, but critical, IA partners. 
While considering reorganization of critical military capabilities under a parent 
organization, it is important to note that the IA lacks an organization that could 
realistically manage multiple agencies effectively in the IWE.  The DoD is the only U.S. 
government agency that has the capacity to manage the IWE. This leads us to believe that 
a DoD-based element must be in charge of an IW-focused organization for the 
foreseeable future. 
If done correctly, reorganization can incorporate the critical success factors for 
IW (as discussed in Chapter III) while instituting the necessary cultural and ideological 
changes (Chapter IV).  Once the correct sub-organizations are identified, the DoD must 
enable the IW-focused organization to establish a reward system that supports the IW 
mission and environment by allowing a focus on long term, population-centric, and host 
nation legitimacy metrics.  
1. Summary of Why Reorganization Is the Only Option 
The U.S. government must overcome the institutional reluctance to reorganize the 
assets necessary to counter threats in the IW environment.  Capabilities that are 
specifically designed to operate within the IWE can and should be reorganized under one 
organization. This will ensure a common purpose and mission focus while preventing 




The option of reorganization does not come without costs.  Reorganization 
requires a fundamental shift within the DoD to allow these capabilities to be moved from 
their existing organizations.  This push for reorganization must be directed from outside 
of the DoD to overcome the natural resistance to change. 
E. HOW TO REORGANIZE ELEMENTS FOR THE IWE 
As stated previously, the IA and DoD need to change in order to more efficiently 
and effectively meet the demands of the IW environment.  The specific changes within 
the IA community, beyond the production of better IA/DoD coordination mechanisms, 
are beyond the scope of this thesis, and require additional research and expertise.  
Therefore, the subsequent paragraphs will concentrate on initiating change within the 
DoD. 
The first challenge in reorganizing is to decide where to start.  Attempting to find 
a pre-existing organization that closely matches the desired organization design5 elements 
minimizes both the cost and time for implementation.  Starting with the U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) appears to make the most sense for the DoD because 
it already owns the preponderance of IW capabilities; however, this choice does not come 
without significant changes. 
At first glance, USSOCOM is a wise starting point because its core tasks6 
encompass the DoD’s IW primary activities.  The personnel within many of the various 
sub-organizations are specially selected and trained to effectively conduct IW tasks.  
However, some elements of its organizational structure, human resources, and culture 
impede its ability to excel in the IW environment.  Specifically, its history is based on 
direct action missions that have created an initial focus and environment on that type of 
warfare.  The special operations community has excelled in direct action and 
conventional style missions with such precision, they have been called a “hyper-
conventional” force (Rothstein, 2006, p. 102). 
                                                 
5 As outlined in Chapter IV, these elements are: structure, environment, work process, human 
resources, and culture. 
6 The 2009 SOCOM Fact Book lists them as: DA, SR, UW, FID, CA, CT, PSYOP, IO, CP, SFA and 
COIN (United States Special Operations Command Public Affairs, 2009, 7). 
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This focus on traditional warfare-type tasks is further exacerbated by 
USSOCOM’s functional sub-organizational structure.7  While this specialization lends 
itself to horizontal collaboration amongst the various services within USSOCOM, it 
forces a prioritization of critical and limited resources between supporting indirect and 
direct mission sets.  Due to the higher perceived payoff, immediate gratification, and 
shorter duration of enemy-centric missions, it is easier to support them instead of the 
longer duration indirect, population-centric missions.   
Further, the focus on human resources within USSOCOM to select and train its 
forces initially creates a sense of “eliteness” for its operators.  However, the prioritization 
of critical and limited resources, combined with perceived preferential treatment and 
rewards provided to forces conducting enemy-centric missions, quickly creates a 
“second-tier” mentality toward operators in the IW environment. This unbalanced human 
resource reward system and organizational culture throughout USSOCOM that favors the 
direct over the indirect, makes it a “misfit” to be the overall operational headquarters 
overseeing Irregular Warfare. 
An additional disadvantage of using USSOCOM as the starting point for 
reorganization is its designation as a functional command.  The direct action units 
USSOCOM provides to the Geographic Combatant Commanders operate effectively in 
part because their culture and focus are more in line with the enemy-centric mindset of 
GCC commanders.  The uniqueness of the IWE requires an organization to have the 
ability not only to provide forces to conduct operations within the IWE, but to influence 
the GCC commanders to ensure the capabilities are utilized effectively as part of the 
greater GCC theater engagement plan.  This allows the organization to reverse the current 
trend of sub-optimal use of those IW-focused capabilities. 
While these shortcomings make USSOCOM appear less than ideal, there are 
significant benefits to using it as a starting point for reorganization.  We believe that 
specific sub-organizations within USSOCOM maintain a comparative advantage in 
                                                 
7 As explained in Chapter III, a functional organizational structure refers to a type of division based on 
functional expertise as opposed to a divisional structure which is based on a type of brand or geographic 
location. 
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conducting operations within the IW environment due to specially selected, trained, 
equipped, and organized forces.  These sub-organizations, which include Army Special 
Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations, have traditionally conducted 
operations within the IW environment, and have established critical long-term 
relationships with key partner nations that also result in instant credibility when working 
with new partner nations.  With the recent addition of the MARSOAG within the Marine 
Special Operations Command, and the additional SF Battalion within each of the five 
active duty SF Groups, the indirect capability within USSOCOM has grown significantly. 
In addition to the selection and training of the individuals within these specific 
sub-organizations, the elements themselves have established cultural norms, metrics, and 
internal rewards systems that are relatively in line with the “7 and 10” environmental 
success factors addressed earlier, but are currently being hindered by the overarching 
direct focus inherent within USSOCOM.  Although not perfect, these specific sub-
organizations are the closest match that exists, and would provide an excellent starting 
point for DoD reorganization.  Organizational centrality focused on these elements, but 
outside of USSOCOM, would enable the institutionalization of IW-relevant cultural 
norms, metrics, and internal rewards systems, while creating a legitimate “proponent for 
special operations approaches to irregular warfare more broadly” (Martinage, 2008, p. 
43).  
An organization working proactively to balance the direct and indirect effort of 
our country has been recommended several times and notably in the Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments’ (CSBA) “Strategy for the Long Haul.”  The reorganization 
of indirect assets under USSOCOM is a topic of discussion for the 2009 QDR, in which 
the CSBA recommends “creating a three-star, sub-unified operational command under 
SOCOM focused on indirect warfare—a Joint Irregular Warfare Command (JIWC)” 
(Martinage, 2008, p. 43).  Although this change is a step in the right direction, the 
greatest concern is the continued presence of two distinctly different cultures within one 
organization.  Much like the difference between conventional forces and SOF drove the 
requirement for USSOCOM’s establishment; the difference between SOF’s indirect and 
direct assets makes it evident that reorganization is needed.  
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F. SUMMARY 
Businesses decide on the scope of change required to maintain relevancy in their 
market by identifying two basic approaches: improve (i.e., change existing) or innovate 
(i.e., create new) (Malhotra, 1998).  This process is useful in illustrating the DoD’s 
current options for dealing with the changing environment. 
Building a new organization will duplicate current capabilities and result in 
additional expenses.  Because the DoD has the capabilities necessary to succeed within 
the IW environment, they should be reorganized under separate organization that is 
focused solely on IW. This ensures a common purpose and mission focus while 
preventing misuse, and limiting redundancy.  The reorganization of IW-specific 
capabilities outside of USSOCOM will allow an IW organization to best utilize the 
operational-environment and organizational-environment critical success factors to select, 
train and manage elements operating within the IWE.  Of great importance, the 
reorganization suggested by the CSBA for a JIWC must be established outside of, instead 
of within, USSOCOM.  
In our final chapter, we will discuss that while USSOCOM owns the 
preponderance of capabilities necessary for successes in the IWE, it remains a misfit.  By 
reorganizing the critical indirect assets, we will balance our indirect and direct 
capabilities, while increasing our strategic options and capabilities for future threats.   
 65
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Throughout history, military organizations—like all large organizations—
have been noted for their resistance to change.  The U.S. military 
establishment shares the resistance to change inherent in the military 
profession.   
– 1985 Senate Armed Services Committee  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis concludes by summarizing the highlights of previous chapters and 
stating our conclusions on how the DoD should organize for Irregular Warfare.  We then 
recommend changes that are critical to implementing our recommendations.  Finally, we 
identify some areas of future research to expand on this thesis. 
B. REVIEW 
Chapter II establishes the doctrinal definitions of both Irregular Warfare and its 
sub-tasks.  We assert throughout this chapter that IW is an environment in which specific 
activities are conducted, synchronized with the DoD, IA and the HN, in order to gain or 
maintain legitimacy and influence over a relevant population.  As defined, we show that 
while the term “IW” is relatively new, the concepts it represents have existed throughout 
the history of armed conflict.  Of the fourteen doctrinal activities within IW, five are 
considered to be primary activities for the DoD: FID, COIN, CT, SSTR, and UW.  The 
first four of these activities are strategic necessities that provide assistance and support to 
willing partner-nations, while UW is a strategic option to provide support to resistance 
movements or insurgencies in support of U.S. objectives.   
In Chapter III, we explain why IW is an extremely complex, long-duration, and 
population-centric environment which requires a different form of organization to operate 
efficiently and effectively.  We further differentiate IW from traditional warfare, with the 
primary difference being a population and state-legitimacy focus versus an enemy-centric 
focus.  These differences demonstrated that organizations designed to conduct traditional 
warfare are not as effective as those designed and organized specifically for IW.  This is 
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not to say that General Purpose Forces cannot operate in the IWE; rather, these aspects 
may be organizationally limiting to fundamental changes required to operate effectively 
in the IW environment.   
We then develop seven external (operational-environmental)8 and ten internal 
(organizational-environmental)9 critical success factors that organizations must 
incorporate when operating in the IW environment.  These environmental success factors 
highlight the differences of IW versus traditional warfare and illuminate why 
organizations established for one type of warfare are sub-optimal in other environments. 
In Chapter IV, we incorporate the complexities and uniqueness of IW discussed in 
Chapter II, and the environmental success factors developed in Chapter III, with the 
principles of organizational theory and design.  This evaluation of organizations using the 
five components of organizational theory and design (Structure, Environment, Work 
Processes, Human Resources, and Culture) showed how incorporating each element of 
the theory with the environmental success factors is necessary for success in the IW 
environment.  In summary, the rewards system and organizational culture elements of 
organizational theory and design proved to be the most important when operating in the 
IWE.   
Finally, in Chapter V, we evaluated the two basic options for change.  Using 
business redesign as a model, we assessed the feasibility of creating a new organization 
versus modifying an existing one.  We argue that building a new organization duplicates 
current capabilities and increases expenses without the required increases in efficiency or 
effectiveness.  Therefore, a new organization is not a viable option.  Then we argue that 
since the DoD has existing capabilities to succeed within the IW environment, they 
should reorganize these capabilities outside of USSOCOM.  This will ensure a common 
                                                 
8 Seven operational-environmental Critical Success Factors: Account for U.S. & Host Nation Political 
Situation; Foster a Home Grown Solution; Develop a Population-Centric Approach; Region Requires 
Long-term Commitment; Increase Capacity of Host Nation Security Forces; Increase Capacity of Host 
Nation Essential Services; Do not rely Solely on Military Force for Success. 
9 Ten organizational-environmental Critical Success Factors: Focus on Enhancing HN Legitimacy; 
Develop Regional Focuses; Reinforce Relationship Building; Maintain a Long-term Focus; Influence 
through Multiple Methods; Operate With and Through HN Forces; Enhance Small Unit Operations; 
Decentralize Decision Making; Foster Innovation and Creativity; Focus Rewards System on Long Term 
Effects. 
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purpose and mission focus while preventing misuse, and limiting redundancy.  This 
reorganization of specific capabilities will allow an IW organization to best utilize the 
operational-environment and organizational-environment factors to select, train and 
manage elements operating within the IWE.  While this reorganization supports the 
CSBA recommendation for a JIWC using existing elements, it differs in that the new 
organization would not be subordinate to USSOCOM.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Recent experiences both in Afghanistan and Iraq have combined with a 
widespread misunderstanding of what Irregular Warfare is and consists of, has led to a 
desire to elevate IW to becoming “as strategically important as traditional warfare” 
(United States Department of Defense, 2008, p. 2).  This elevation of IW has challenged 
all within the DoD to adapt at the expense of maintaining a balance of capabilities.  By 
understanding the differences between Irregular and Traditional Warfare, and the key 
factors that enable success in both, it becomes obvious that an organization suited for 
one, is sub-optimal for the other.  To better prepare the DoD to meet future challenges in 
both environments, the DoD should establish a separate organization, incorporating 
existing capabilities, focused on conducting operations within the IWE.   
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
After writing this thesis, our group feels there are several things that must happen 
in order for the U.S. to maintain its presence as the premier military force in the world.  
Acknowledging that there is some institutional resistance to any change, this short list 
helps better prepare us for the future.  While we recognize that our proposed 
reorganization is drastic, it is essential to understand the recommendations and implement 
as many as possible. 
First, this process begins with a better understanding of what Irregular Warfare is.  
This not only includes knowing the definition, but understanding the nuances of IW, and 
how they differ from traditional warfare (Chapters II and III).  The recognition that IW 
requires a different mindset and capabilities for success helps illustrate that certain 
organizations are better suited for IW than others.  This enables our senior military and 
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civilian leaders to realize that the key to success lies not in making everyone equally 
capable at doing everything, but in adjusting our organizations to better develop a 
balanced approach to defeat all future threats.   
Second, to allow the DoD to fulfill Secretary Gates’ goal of balancing traditional 
and irregular warfare, the military must acknowledge that not everyone is equally 
proficient at conducting the five core activities of IW.  Moreover, some organizations are 
incapable of fully integrating the seven external and 10 internal factors (Chapter III) 
critical for success in the IWE. 
Third, the core of this new organization includes those elements uniquely suited 
to conduct the five core IW activities and most capable of integrating the critical success 
factors.  As identified previously, these elements are: Army Special Forces, 
Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, and Marine Special Operations Advisory Group.  
This core must be unified under one headquarters outside of USSOCOM and supported 
by other elements from across DoD to ensure it can fully support the GCC’s IW 
campaign plans. 
Fourth, once the core elements of this new organization are identified, they should 
be evaluated according to the “7 & 10” critical success factors to identify what 
organizational changes must be made.  Some of these changes may be minor, such as 
regional orientation.  Some, however, like adjusting the human resource components to 
better reinforce positive behavior or establish a new culture, are significant in their scope 
and impact. 
Finally, this reorganized composition of forces requires the support of the nation’s 
civilian leadership.  Such a large reorganization of forces must be directed and 
championed outside of the military leadership.  Legislation must require this organization 
not only to provide IW-focused capabilities, but to also have the authority to plan and 
implement IW campaign plans in support of the GCC.  A failure to force this change will 
hinder implementation and effectiveness of this reorganization.  This is because, 
“Throughout history, military organizations—like all large organizations—have been 
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noted for their resistance to change.  The U.S. military establishment shares the resistance 
to change inherent in the military profession” (United States Senate, Committee on 
Armed Services, 1985, p. 8).   
E. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis has been an arduous journey of research, analysis, and application, but 
by no means does it provide the absolute answer to the problems that the Irregular 
Warfare Environment places on the United States.  Our research has produced a 
recommendation that, if followed, will put the Department of Defense on track to 
produce a fully balanced approach to warfare that will serve us well into the next 
millennium.  To further refine this recommendation, we have identified several key areas 
that should be studied in the near future.   
The first area of future research is the further assessment of what capabilities exist 
within the DoD that may be useful within the IWE.  Although we have identified the core 
elements that must be a part of an IW organization, there are other elements that already 
exist that may prove to be beneficial.  These elements may need to be permanently 
assigned as core elements, or they may be task-organized, based on the needs of a given 
situation.  
The second area of future research involves examining the current DoD force 
structure to identify redundant or excess capacity in order to create an IW headquarters 
without adding additional force structure.  This may require the reorganization or 
reassigning of responsibilities and assets of multiple existing headquarters. 
The third area of future research deals with two aspects of the interagency.  First, 
what changes need to be made in the IA to enable them to play a more productive role 
within the IWE?  Second, how can the DoD and the IA better coordinate in order to 




Lastly, the fourth area of future research deals with funding and legislation.  
Specifically, what legislation is required for reorganizing?  Additionally, what special 
funding legislation is necessary in order to give an IW organization the authorities and 
resources it requires? 
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